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DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS LIMITED TO SAME-SEX
COUPLES: SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
PAUL R. LYND*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, the number of employers offering domestic
partnership' benefits to unmarried employees exploded. The
number continues to grow.2 As employers compete for employees by
offering greater benefits and as more parts of society acknowledge
committed relationships that fall outside of the traditional male-
female marriage model, the number of employers with domestic
partnership benefits policies should continue to grow.
In the employment context, benefits traditionally have flowed
to couples through marriage. When an employer has provided
benefits to an employee, the employee's spouse typically also has
become eligible to receive the same benefits. The definition of
"spouse" has tracked the definition provided by state marriage
* Judicial Research Attorney, California Court of Appeal, 1999-2000. J.D., UCLA
School of Law, 1999. A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1992. My thanks to John Rea,
Patricia Lofton, and Kevin Reschenberg for their comments on drafts of this Article. Special
thanks to Tom Coleman and Jose Millan for their invaluable assistance in my research.
1. "Domestic partnership generally refers to two people living together in a committed,
mutually interdependent relationship." Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note,A More
Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1164, 1164 n.3 (1992). Other terms used in the context of employee benefits to
designate the same type of relationship or its members are functional marriage equivalent,"
"alternative family," "family type unit," "life partner," and "spousal equivalent." See SALLY
KOHN, THE POLICY INSTITTE OF THE NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, THE
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP ORGANIZING MANUAL FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFrrs 2 (1999).
2. The precise number of employers offering domestic partnership benefits is difficult
to calculate. There is no central location for the reporting of such information. In 1997, a
survey of 1,502 employers with 200 or more employees found that 13% offered health benefits
to non-traditional partners; one in four companies with over 5,000 employees offered such
benefits. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 10. In 1999, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
identified 570 private sector companies, nonprofit organizations, and unions offering some
type of domestic partnership benefits. See id. at app. 120-25. The organization also
identified 141 colleges and universities and 87 state and municipal governments providing
these types of benefits. See id. at 126-29. Growth in the number of employers offering
domestic partnership benefits has been extremely rapid. See, e.g., Terry Wilson, Family
Values, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1997, (Perspective) at 1 (reporting that only five companies were
known to offer domestic partnership benefits in 1990, and estimating"at least a 100 percent
increase every year" between that time and the date of the article).
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laws.' In other words, a lawful marriage between a man and a
woman has been the qualifying criterion. The lack of a mar-
riage-whether the reason be choice or a couple's legal inability to
marry-has rendered an employee ineligible to obtain benefits
covering her partner. Employees in opposite-sex couples could
attain eligibility for couples' benefits by marrying. But employees
in same-sex couples have faced an impossibility: no state has or
presently recognizes marriage between two individuals of the same
sex, so there is no legal way for a same-sex couple to attain
eligibility for marriage-based couples' benefits. Marriage-based
eligibility for couples' benefits results in a disparity in compensa-
tion, as employees in a particular job classification, performing the
same work, and doing so at the same wage or salary can be paid
different amounts in total compensation-all depending on whether
an employee receives benefits for a spouse.4
3. See Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic
Partnership and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
267, 281 (1998) ("Many employee benefit plans that provide benefits for the spouse of an
employee do not define the term spouse. Or, if the term is defined, the plan relies on state
law for a determination of who is legally married."); see also Hinman v. Department of
Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that 'a
homosexual's same-sex partner can never be a'spouse'" because the California state statute
defines marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman).
4. This bottom line disparity in total compensation occurs not only between employees
with opposite-sex spouses and employees with same-sex partners and who cannot legally
marry their partners. It also results generally between married employees and unmarried
employees. All unmarried employees, regardless of whether they are in a relationship,
receive less aggregate compensation for their work than do married employees who receive
employer-provided benefits for spouses. See University of Alaska v. Tumeo, 933 P.2d 1147,
1149 (Alaska 1997).
"[Bly providing added health care coverage for married employees but not for
unmarried employees, [the university] is compensating married employees to
a greater extent than it compensates unmarried employees" and that "using
marital status as a classification for determining which of its employees will
receive additional compensation in the form of third-party health coverage...
violates state laws prohibiting marital status discrimination."
Id. (quoting the superior court opinion); Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d
121, 125 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (MT~o the degree it allows married employees to include their
spouses and dependent children in their health insurance coverage, the state may be said to
offer greater health insurance benefits to its married employees than to its single
employees."). Because benefits can be a significant component of an employee's
compensation, the disparity in aggregate compensation can be considerable. The United
States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that benefits accounted for
an average of 27.5% of employers' compensation costs for civilian (private industry and state
and local government) employees as of March 1999. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL 99-173, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION-MARCH
1999 6 tbl.l (1999). For example, health insurance costs account for an average of 5.8% of a
civilian employer's total employee compensation costs. See id An employee and her spouse
or partner thus enjoy noticeable savings, as a percentage of income, by having an employer
cover insurance or other costs for the employee's spouse or partner. Even if an employer
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The denial of spousal benefits to employees in same-sex
relationships has been litigated, but mostly unsuccessfully, under
various provisions prohibiting employment discrimination.' In
setting eligibility criteria for employee benefits, employers are not
bound by definitions of marriage or of the terms "spouse" or
"dependent 6 as used in state law.7 Given that freedom and driven
by a variety of reasons including competition for employees and
heightened interest in addressing discrimination against gay and
lesbian and unmarried employees, a growing number of employers
have voluntarily instituted domestic partnership benefits policies.'
With these policies, employers have expanded the definition of
"dependent" to include an employee's unmarried domestic partner
for purposes of benefits eligibility. Most employers require an
employee to submit an affidavit or declaration certifying the
sponsors a group benefits program but does not contribute to paying any of the costs for an
employee or her dependents, an employee still likely receives a benefit from the existence of
the program because group coverage typically results in lower rates.
5. The cases challenged the benefits policies of state or local government employers
under state employment discrimination statutes or constitutional provisions. Most of the
challenges failed. See, e.g., Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 616 (rejecting claims of sexual
orientation and marital status discrimination); Ross v. Denver Dep't of Health and Hesps.,
883 P.2d 516, 519-22 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v.
Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828, 834-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (same); Phillips, 482 N.W.2d
at 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (same). But see Tumeo, 933 P.2d at 1147 (upholding ruling that
public university's denial of couples' benefits to employees in unmarried relationships
constituted marital status discrimination under statute with no exception for benefits in
effect at time of lower court's ruling); Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435,
437 (Ore. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that public university's denial of benefits to unmarried
employee's same-sex partners constituted sexual orientation discrimination in violation of
Oregon Constitution).
6. Under most benefits policies, the term "dependent" traditionally has encompassed
an employee's "spouse" under a lawful marriage and dependent children. See, e.g., Hinman,
167 Cal. App. 3d at 522 n.4 (including spouse and children in definition of term "dependent");
Rutgers, 689 A.2d at 830-31 (same); Phillips, 482 N.W.2d at 124 (same).
7. In some cases, however, municipal government employers may be bound by
definitions in state law. Compare, e.g., Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91, 96-100
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that municipal government's extension of benefits to the
unmarried same-sex domestic partners of employees did not contravene state law or public
policy regarding marriage), with Lillyv. Cityof Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107,108 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that state statute's definition of "dependents" precluded the municipal
government from expanding benefits eligibility to unmarried domestic partners).
8. "Domestic partnership is first and foremost a workplace concept. It establishes a civil
rights remedy to the pervasive practice of disproportionately providing married employees
with health insurance, paid bereavement, family sick leave and other 'family' based benefits
that are denied to unmarried employees and their families." Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock
Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 142-43
(1996). 'The term was developed and is primarily used to designate the non-spousal
relationships that are appropriate for receiving employer-provided health benefits. As such
... it has little practical application outside of the workplace, but is a term of art developed
within the employment benefit context." Id. at 111 n.7.
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existence of a qualifying domestic partnership,9 and some employers
require additional proof of the relationship."0 But once an employee
qualifies her relationship and enrolls her domestic partner in her
employer's benefits program, the domestic partner becomes eligible
for the same, or many of the same, benefits that she would be
eligible to receive as the employee's lawful spouse.
As a result of domestic partnership benefits policies allowing
unmarried employees to receive couples' benefits, these policies
remove a lawful marriage vel non as the criterion for determining
eligibility for couples' benefits. With marital status removed, on
what basis do domestic partnership benefits policies determine
eligibility for benefits? As a matter of employment discrimination
law, the answer can be significant because the basis may be an
impermissible criterion under applicable employment discrimina-
tion statutes.
Many policies open benefits to all employees with unmarried
domestic partners, and impose only general requirements designed
to establish that two individuals have a mutual and exclusive
commitment to each other." Some policies, however, limit eligibil-
ity for domestic partnership benefits to employees in same-sex or,
9. For instance, Sun Microsystems requires an employee and her domestic partner to
execute an Affidavit of Domestic Partnership certifying that: (1) they are each other's
domestic partner and intend to remain so indefinitely;, (2) neither person is married; (3)
neither person is related by blood to a degree of closeness that would prohibit legal marriage
in the state in which they legally reside; (4) they reside together in the same residence and
intend to do so indefinitely; and (5) they are jointly responsible for each other's common
welfare and financial obligations. See Sun Microsystems Domestic Partnership Affidavit, in
KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 58.
10. For example, California provides for employees of state agencies and retired state
employees, as well as employees and retirees of local government agencies that contract with
the California Public Employees Retirement System, to receive health benefits for their
domestic partners. These employees or retirees must file a Declaration of Domestic
Partnership with the California Secretary of State, which maintains a registry of domestic
partnerships in the state. See CAL. GOV'TCODE § 22868 (West Supp. 2000). Fox Inc. requires
the following certification: "In addition, if we live in ajurisdiction which permits registration
of domestic partners, including Spousal Equivalents, I declare and acknowledge that I and
my Spousal Equivalent have registered, or will register within the next 31 days, as domestic
partners in that jurisdiction.* See Fox Inc. Affidavit ofMarriagelSpousal Equivalency, in
KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 77. While not requiring registration with a government agency,
American Express requires that two items of proof accompany an Affidavit of Domestic
Partnership: (1) a copy of a mortgage, lease, or utility bill showing the names of both
domestic partners, or copies of drivers' licenses or tax returns for both partners showing the
same address; and (2) evidence of joint bank or credit card accounts, a designation of both
partners as signatories on a safe deposit box, or wills in which each partner names the other
partner as the primary residual beneficiary. See American Express Affidavit of Domestic
Partnership, in KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 61.
11. See supra notes 9, 10.
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in at least one case, "gay or lesbian" 2 domestic partnerships.
Employees in unmarried opposite-sex (or, as mentioned, under at
least one policy, "heterosexual") domestic partnerships are ineligi-
ble. Employers with such limited policies13 justify them on the
ground that those policies "level the playing field" by remedying the
legal inability of employees in same-sex couples to marry their
partners and thereby obtain spousal benefits. Under that rationale,
every employee who is part of a couple conceivably is eligible to
obtain couples' benefits: employees in opposite-sex couples may
marry their partners and obtain spousal benefits, while employees
in same-sex couples may declare domestic partnership and receive
domestic partnership benefits. This reasoning has an undeniable
equitable appeal. Nonetheless, in a somewhat paradoxical twist,
limited policies--which are designed to remedy the discrimination
that results when an employer dispenses couples' benefits in
accordance with state definitions of marriage-themselves give rise
to a new question of discrimination. By basing eligibility for
domestic partnership benefits on an unmarried couple's gender
composition or on sexual orientation, limited policies may violate
employment discrimination laws.
This Article examines, under employment discrimination
statutes, the legality of limited domestic partner benefits policies.
Part II considers the reasons motivating employers to provide
domestic partnership benefits and, if they do so, perhaps to limit
them to only certain domestic partnerships. Part III discusses the
legality of limited policies under state and local employment
discrimination laws. It first notes the very limited, if any, applica-
bility of state and local laws to domestic partnership benefits
because the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)14 largely preempts state and local regulation of
employee benefits. Next, assuming no ERISA preemption in a
particular circumstance, that part considers whether limited
policies may constitute marital status or sexual orientation
discrimination under state or local laws.1" It reviewsAyyoub v. City
of Oakland,' an administrative decision which held that a limited
policy constituted sexual orientation discrimination in violation of
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. This Article uses the term "limited" to refer generally to domestic partnership
benefits policies that are limited to some domestic partnerships based on the gender
composition of the couple or on sexual orientation.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
15. Federal law does not prohibit employment discrimination on either basis.
16. No. 99-02937 (Cal. State Labor Comm'r Oct. 27, 1997).
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California law. The decision is the only ruling to hold a limited
policy illegal.
Due to the fact that ERISA largely preempts state and local
regulation of employee benefits, Part IV turns to federal law and
examines limited policies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. This part reviews two recent federal district court cases
rejecting sex discrimination claims brought against employers with
policies limited to employees in same-sex domestic partnerships.
In those cases, the plaintiffs essentially contended that their
employers discriminated based on the sex of the employee and the
sex of the employee's domestic partner-i.e., if the sex of the
employee or her domestic partner had been different so that the two
domestic partners were of the same sex, the employer would have
granted domestic partnership benefits. The argument amounts to
a claim of discrimination based on the sex of a person with whom
an individual associates. Although the courts in the two cases
dismissed such a claim, Title VII authority not considered by those
courts supports the claim and undermines the analysis in those
cases and their conclusions that same-sex-only policies comply with
Title VII. A clear, but little-noticed, line of Title VII cases holds
that disparate treatment based on the race of a person with whom
an individual associates constitutes discrimination because of the
individual's race. Other Title VII authority supports recognition of
an analogous rule under Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion. Applying such a rule and applicable Title VII sex discrimina-
tion case law, this Article concludes that domestic partnership
benefits policies limited to employees in same-sex domestic partner-
ships discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.
II. COMPETITION, COSTS, AND DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP: WHY EMPLOYERS MAY OFFER DOMESTIC
PARTNER BENEFITS, YET MAY LIMIT THEM TO EMPLOYEES IN
SAME-SEX COUPLES
Domestic partner benefits give recognition and economic
support to committed relationships that fall outside of the tradi-
tional male-female marriage model. The proliferation of these
benefits represents a significant change in social policy and
attitudes.17 Given the progressive nature of domestic partner
17. See Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A
Marketplace Innovation and a Less than Perfect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 337, 349-50 (1998).
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benefits, a particularly striking aspect of their development and
growth is the degree to which they have been an instrument of the
marketplace and private sector. Whereas some state and local
governments have established domestic partnership registries for
couples to register their relationships and offered benefits to their
own employees,"8 government generally has not imposed any
mandate on private employers to provide domestic partner
benefits.'9 Accounting for the majority of the employers with
domestic partner benefits policies, private employers mostly have
acted on their own accord in instituting them. Domestic partner
benefits thus largely have been a private sector innovation.2"
Competitive and economic considerations influence private employ-
ers' decisions about whether to initiate such benefits and how far to
extend them.2 Considerations about costs and the belief that such
benefits serve only to fill the gap created by marriage-based
eligibility for couples' benefits, as well as competing conceptions of
domestic partnership, may prompt employers to limit domestic
partner benefits to employees in same-sex relationships.22
18. See id. at 340-41.
19. The reluctance of government to impose a mandate on private employers to provide
domestic partner benefits most likely is attributable to the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), which largely preempts state and local regulation of employee
benefits. See infra Part lilA Two jurisdictions have imposed some form of mandate upon
private employers to provide domestic partner benefits. Hawaii required that employers
provide specified benefits to an employee's "reciprocal beneficiary" if the employer provides
those benefits to the spouses of married employees. The City and County of San Francisco
enacted an ordinance requiring that contractors doing business with the local government
not discriminate between the employees' spouses and domestic partners in providing
benefits. Federal district courts held that ERISA preempted beth laws in substantial part,
insofar as the statutes applied to benefit plans covered by ERISA. See Fisk, aupra note 3, at
270-71.
20. See Knauer, supra note 17, at 337-38. "TIhe debate over domestic partnership
benefits is taking place in the strange surroundings of the corporate beard room, the union
hall, and the personnel manager's office." Id. at 338 (citations omitted). "On a firm by firm
basis, the marketplace has responded to the demand for innovation in the case of same-sex
relationships.... Mhe marketplace is now setting the terms of the debate." Id. at 352.
21. See id. at 357 ("The growing consensus among employers is that domestic partnership
benefits are a 'low cost way to draw top talent."' (citations omitted)).
22. Public employers, although not in business to earn a profit, also face the same
pressures and considerations. They compete with each other and with private employers for
employees and also face pressure to control their benefits costs. Additionally, political
considerations can cause them to limit the scope of domestic partnership policies. See infra
note 41 (describing the legislative history of California's domestic partner policy). Some
public employers have limited their domestic partner benefits plans to employees in same-sex
domestic partnerships. See, e.g., Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 68 F. Supp. 2d 963, 966 (N.D.
IMI. 1999); American Ass'n for Single People, Governments Extending Health Benefits to
Domestic Partners (visited Feb. 26, 2000) <httpJ/www.singlesrights.com/dp-hlth.html>
(identifying 13 such public employers, including the cities of Chicago, Denver, New Orleans,
Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Tucson).
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One of the key motivations behind the adoption of domestic
partner benefits has been competition for employees in the labor
marketplace. Employers recognize that more comprehensive
compensation packages, including domestic partner benefits, are
essential to attracting or retaining current employees.23 Domestic
partner benefits are increasingly a key hiring or retention
incentive.24 The role of labor market competition in spurring
employers to offer domestic partner benefits is especially evident in
the industry groups in which these benefits are most common.
High technology companies, entertainment and media industry
employers, financial and insurance firms, academia, and law firms
have proven the most likely to offer domestic partner benefits.25
Competition for employees in some of these segments of the labor
market, which either have experienced large growth in the number
of jobs or compete for highly skilled and educated employees, has
been intense in some circumstances. The existence or absence of
domestic partner benefits can be, respectively, an incentive or a
deterrent to an individual accepting or continuing employment with
an employer.
An employer that considers whether to initiate domestic
partner benefits must factor the cost of such benefits. As it is,
employee benefits are a substantial portion of an employer's total
compensation costs.' Concerns about large increases in the cost of
benefits may cause employers to limit their domestic partner
benefits costs by limiting eligibility to employees in same-sex
relationships because, most likely, an employer has fewer employ-
23. See, e.g., Pamela Burdman, UC Partner Policy May Hit Snag, S.F. Law Requires
System to Include Straight Couples, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 6,1997, at A21, available
in 1997 WL 6698940 (reporting that the issue of domestic partner benefits arises at the
University of California at Berkeley in 'at least 10 percent of recruitment decisions").
24. A 1999 survey of 279 human resources professionals in 19 industries completed by
the Society for Human Resources Management and the Commerce Clearing House found
that domestic partners benefits are the -top-ranked hiring incentive for executives and the
third-ranked incentive for managers and line workers. See id.; see also Domestic Partner
Benefits for Employees' Same-Sex Partners, in HOLLYWOOD SUPPORTS-SAME-SEX PARTNER
HEALTH COVERAGE, SUMMER 1997, at 1,1 (on file with author) ("[In the entertainment
industry, domestic partners benefit are] increasingly a competitive issue.... To recruit and
retain valuable employees, the policy of most large employers in the entertainment industry
is to provide benefits competitive with others offered in the industry."); Planet Out,
Citigroup Plans Partner Benefits, Feb. 9, 2000 (visited Feb 10, 2000)
<http: //www.planetout.com/pno> (reporting that Citigroup Inc. announced it would offer
domestic partner benefits in furtherance of its "'competitive goal of becoming the employer
of choice in the financial services industry"); Planet Out, PartnerNews in Brief DPEffective
Hiring Incentive, Aug. 20, 1999 (visited Mar. 17, 2000) <httpJ/www.planetout.com/pno>.
25. In the high technology industry, an estimated 20% of employers offer domestic
partner benefits. See KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 49.
26. See BUREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 4.
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ees in same-sex domestic partnerships than employees in opposite-
sex relationships.27 Costs under a policy open equally to employees
in a same-sex or opposite-sex domestic partnership would be higher
than under a plan limited to same-sex couples. As long as the
relationship meets the employer's eligibility criteria, every em-
ployee conceivably would be eligible to add a domestic partner
without the requisite of marriage.2' Nonetheless, employers with
benefits available to employees in same-sex and opposite-sex
couples incur low domestic partner benefits expenses as a percent-
age of total benefits costs. 29 In any event, once sex discrimination
has been shown, under Title VIII, cost is not an available defense. 0
By taking the lead in establishing andadvancing domestic
partner benefits, employers-especially private-sector employ-
ers-have assumed a role in shaping and influencing social policy.
Employers have led the way in providing economic support to
unmarried relationships to which the law still grants little official
27. For instance, when the San Francisco Board of Supervisors considered legislation to
require contractors doing business with the City and County of San Francisco to provide
employees in domestic partnerships with the same couples' benefits that they provide to
married employees, employers lobbied the board to limit the requirement to employees in
same-sex couples. The employers feared that including opposite-sex couples would
significantly increase the cost of complying with the ordinance. See Editorial, Room to
Compromise on Domestic Partners, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 11, 1997, at A24, available
in 1997 WL 6695316; Yumi Wilson, Partners Law Won't Exclude Straights, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Apr. 9, 1997, at A13, available in 1997 WL 6695148. As enacted, San Francisco's
ordinance applies to same-sex and opposite-sex couples. See id
28. A report by Hewitt Associates, a benefits consulting firm, found that employees in
opposite-sex relationships account for approximately two-thirds of the participants in
domestic partner benefits programs when employers open domestic partner benefits to all
employees. See Jonathan Marshall, Domestic Partners Benefits Unused, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., May 31, 1995, at B1, available in 1995 WL 5283839. Overall, domestic partner
benefits have a low usage rate. When employers offer the benefits to all employees, the
participation rate has averaged about 3% of an employer's workforce. See id. When an
employer provides benefits only to employees in same-sex domestic partnerships, the usage
rate has been about 1% of an employer's workforce. See id.
29. The City of Berkeley, California, which enacted its domestic partner benefits policy
in December 1984 reported that 120, or 8.9%, of its employees participated in the plan, and
that only 16% of the participating employees were in same-sex relationships. See KOHN,
supra note 1, app. at 42. Berkeley's total participation rate is high among domestic partner
benefits programs, although domestic partner benefits accounted for only 2.8% of Berkeley's
total benefits costs. See id. In the City of Los Angeles, 925, or 2.31%, of approximately
40,000 city employees enrolled domestic partners. See id. Sixteen percent of the enrollees
were same-sex domestic partners, and domestic partner benefits represented 1.2% of total
benefits costs. See id. The State of New York Health Insurance Program had 1,842, or
0.94%, of approximately 195,000 covered employees enroll a domestic partner. See id. app.
at 48. Twenty-two percent of the participants were involved in same-sex domestic
partnerships. See id. Domestic partner benefits totaled 0.24% of benefits costs. See id.
30. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 n.14 (1983); Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,685 n.26 (1983); Manhart v. Los
Angeles Dep't of Water and Power, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 & n.32 (1978).
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recognition or support."1 As a result, in addition to competitive
considerations and costs, employers designing domestic partner
benefits policies must consider a number of issues concerning
domestic partnership. If domestic partnership is an alternative to
marriage, then what is the role of domestic partnership? A
domestic partnership may be seen as (1) a permanent relationship
that is an alternative to marriage and open to any couple, with
some or all of the benefits that are consequent to a lawful marriage;
(2) a temporary alternative to marriage for same-sex couples that
fills a gap in marriage laws, but which would be superseded by
lawful marriage if a state ever allows same-sex couples to marry
legally; or (3) a pertanent parallel institution existing only for
same-sex couples that is essentially a de facto marriage with many
or all of the benefits consequent to a lawful marriage, but without
a marriage license or the designation "marriage" conferred by law.
Among these possibilities, the notion of domestic partnership held
by an employer (or any policymaker) can determine whether
benefits are open to all unmarried employees or only to employees
in same-sex relationships.
Within the above notions of domestic partnership, two concep-
tions exist: the alternative family structure concept and the
parallel institution concept. The alternative family structure
conception of domestic partnership regards it as a family structure
that is an alternative between lawful marriage and singlehood.
This conception regards domestic partnership as a "third social
category of family: people who are neither married nor single."3 2
It recognizes an expanded definition of family that includes
individuals who form a unit serving the functions of a family,
although the unit is not based on a lawful marriage.3 For various
social, legal, financial, or religious reasons, a formal marriage may
not be an option for two persons who form a couple--despite the
fact that they, for all functional purposes, constitute a family unit.
The alternative family structure conception of domestic partnership
confers family benefits to those family units even in the absence of
a marriage through which to channel family benefits.' As a result
31. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 49 (explaining reasons why corporations are
better able than employers in the public sector to enact domestic partner benefits).
32. Ettelbrick, supra note 8, at 144.
33. See id.
34. The problem is not so much that lesbian and gay couples cannot marry.
Rather, it is that all of the legal and social benefits and privileges constructed
for families are available only to those families joined by marriage or biology.
.. Singular pursuit of same-sex marriage serves to reinforce the primacy of
marriage in family definitions, rather than furthering the ... battle... to open
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of the alternative family structure conception looking only to the
functional purpose of a family unit rather than its composition,
employers following that concept would make domestic partner
benefits available to all employees in domestic partnerships
regardless of the sexes or sexual orientations of the partners.
The parallel institution conception of domestic partnership, on
the other hand, would limit benefits to only same-sex (or gay and
lesbian, depending on the definition in an employer's policy)35
couples. Since the time of the first domestic partnership ordinances,
domestic partnership has been viewed as a "parallel institution" to
marriage.' Under this view, domestic partnership serves for the
most part to accord some recognition and a modicum of benefits to
same-sex couples as consolation for their legal inability to marry.
Limited domestic partner benefits policies reflect the parallel
institution conception. In initiating a limited policy, the Lotus
Development Corporation encapsulated the rationale behind the
parallel institution conception. In 1991, the firm became the
largest employer at that time to offer domestic partner benefits,37
but it limited such benefits to employees in same-sex couples.
38
Lotus justified its limited policy as "trying to level the playing field"
because same-sex couples cannot marry and obtain spousal
benefits. 9 In accordance with the parallel institution view, limited
policies thus seek to equalize benefits by providing couples who
the door to family benefits for those who function as family as well as for those
who have formalized their relationships.
Id. at 122.
35. The City of Oakland, California, limited eligibility for its domestic partner health
benefits program to "gay" and "lesbian" couples, explicitly basing eligibility on sexual
orientation rather than sex. See infra text accompanying note 97.
36. See Editorial, Domestic Partners, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 2, 1989, at A32,
available in 1989 WL 7161363.
37. See Davis Stripp, Lotus Extends Company Benefits to Cover Domestic Partners of
Homosexual Staff, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1991, at B6.
38. See id.
39. See id; see also Foray v. Bell Atl., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("'Under
U.S. law same-sex domestic partners cannot marry, while opposite sex partners can. In view
of this, coverage for Domestic Partners is offered only to same sex domestic partners, not to
heterosexual partnerships.' (quoting a letter denying request of employee for domestic
partners benefits for his female domestic partner)); David W. Dunlap, Gay Partners oflB.M.
Workers to Get Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, at A18 (reporting that IBM's policy does
not cover opposite-sex couples because "heterosexual couples have the option of getting
married"); MGM to Offer Benefits to Homosexual Partners, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1996,
available in 1996 WL-WSJ 3085329 (explaining that domestic partnership benefits would be
limited to same-sex couples because "'heterosexuals have the option to marry, when
homosexuals cannot"' (quoting a spokesporson for Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc.)).
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cannot marry-but who presumably would do so'-a way to obtain
the couples' benefits that they would receive if they could marry
and did so. This reasoning, of course, presupposes without any
basis that employers are bound in the first place to follow state
definitions of marriage in determining eligibility for couples'
benefits.
Under the parallel institution conception, domestic partnership
represents a substitute for marriage and an institution limited to
certain couples based on their gender composition and its resulting
legal inability to marry. A couple is either (1) of the opposite sex
and able to legally marry to obtain spousal benefits, and therefore
ineligible for domestic partner benefits, or (2) of the same sex and
unable to legally marry to obtain spousal benefits, so therefore
eligible for domestic partner benefits. A couple would be eligible for
only one type of benefits, so marriage and domestic partnership are
parallel institutions that never merge. In that respect, the parallel
institution conception and limited policies are efficient because they
reach only as far as necessary to fill a gap in current law.4 '
40. Oracle limits its domestic partner benefits to same-sex couples. In its affidavit of
domestic partnership, Oracle requires an employee and her domestic partner to declare:
Neither of us is legally married. We would legally marry each other if we could,
and we intend to do so if marriage becomes available in our state of residence.
We are not related by blood to a degree of closeness that would prohibit legal
marriage in our state of residence.
Oracle Statement of Domestic Partnership, in KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 56. Similarly,
Northwestern University requires an employee and her domestic partner to certify that they
'would marry or establish a legally recognized Domestic Partnership if it were available to
us under the laws of the state in which we live." Northwestern University Declaration of
Same-Sex Domestic Partnership, in KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 115.
41. California's domestic partnership scheme demonstrates this point. It limits domestic
partner registrations to couples in which either (1) "[bloth persons are members of the same
sex" or (2) both persons are of opposite sexes and over the age of 62 and satisfy the eligibility
criteria for old-age benefits under the Social Security Act. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(bX6XA)-(B)
(West Supp. 2000). Both previsions fill gaps in other laws that prevent or deter couples from
marrying: same-sex couples cannot legally marry, and elderly couples may avoid marrying
because a marriage would result in a decrease in Social Security benefits. Employees or
retirees of state or local agencies covered by the California Public Employees Retirement
System must fall within either of the above two classes in order to qualify to receive health
benefits for domestic partners. See CAL. GoVT CODE § 22868 (West Supp. 2000). As
introduced, the legislation that established California's domestic partnership arrangement
defined domestic partnership without reference to sex. See K-B. 26, § 1, 1999-2000 Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (as introduced Dec. 7, 1998). The legislation advanced through the
California legislature, but, at the insistence of Governor Gray Davis, the author inserted
amendments limiting domestic partnership to same-sex couples. Davis believed that
opposite-sex couples can choose to marry instead. See Robert Salladay, Governor Forces
Weaker Bill on Domestic Partners, SAN FRANcISCO EXAMINER, July 8, 1999, at A6, available
in LEXIS, News Library, San Francisco Examiner File. When it approved legislation
creating domestic partnership eligibility for same-sex and elderly opposite-sex couples, the
California Legislature simultaneously approved a second bill creating a domestic partnership
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Because the parallel institution conception treats domestic
partner benefits for same-sex couples as a substitute for unattain-
able spousal benefits, it would eliminate those benefits if same-sex
couples become able to marry legally.42 Each employee then would
be equally able to marry her chosen partner, regardless of her sex
and the sex of her partner. At that point, as a device designed to fill
a gap in marriage laws that prohibit same-sex partners from
marrying and obtaining spousal benefits, domestic partner benefits
would cease to have a gap to fill. 4'
scheme open to same-sex and opposite-sex couples regardless of the sexes of their members.
See S.B. 75, 1999-2000 Leg., let Reg. Sees. (Cal. 1999). The Governor vetoed that bill as
"overly broad." See Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of California, to the Members of the
Senate (Oct. 2, 1999) ("I am returning Senate Bill 75 without my signature because it is
overly broad.") (on file with author).
42.We need only look to the present in order to predict the future.... Once
marriage is available, gay and lesbian couples will most certainly be required
to marry in order to receive benefits. Gay couples, like straight couples now,
will be forced to marry in order to get the benefits.
Ettelbrick, supra note 8, at 129-30. Oracle's domestic partner benefits policy explicitly
contemplates and provides for such a development. The Oracle Statement of Domestic
Partnership includes the following acknowledgment by an employee and her domestic
partner: "We understand that Oracle domestic partner benefits are available to us only when
legal marriage is not available to us in our state of residence." See Oracle Statement of
Domestic Partnership, in KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 57.
43. State constitutional challenges to laws barring same-sex marriage,.while successful
in varying respects, ultimately have not yielded the right of same-sex couples to marry. A
Hawaii circuit court held Hawaii's statute limiting the issuance of marriage licenses to
opposite-sex couples unconstitutional as sex discrimination under the Equal Protection
clause of the Hawaii Constitution. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). Before that decision was final, Hawaii voters ratified an amendment
to the Hawaii Constitution allowing the Hawaii legislature to reserve marriage to opposite-
sex couples. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. As a result, the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed
the circuit court judgment and dismissed the case as moot. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371,
1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *8 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999). An Alaska superior court ordered Alaska
to establish a compelling state interest at trial to support the denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples under the Alaska Constitution's guarantee of the right to privacy. See
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Feb. 27, 1998). Later in that same year, Alaska voters approved a state constitutional
amendment to overturn that decision. See ALASKA CONST. art 1, § 25 ("To be valid or
recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.").
More recently, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Common Benefits Clause of the
Vermont Constitution requires that the state "extend to same-sex couples the common
benefits that flow from marriage under Vermont law." Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,867 (Vt.
1999). The court, while holding that an equality of outcomes is required, declined to order
that same-sex couples be given the legal right to marry. See id. Instead, it deferred to the
Vermont legislature for determination of a remedy- 'Whether this ultimately takes the form
of inclusion within marriage laws themselves or a parallel 'domestic partnership' system of
some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the legislature." Id. In response, the
Vermont legislature has declined to extend marriage to same-sex couples, but has moved to
establish a system of "civil unions" for same-sex couples. See Carey Goldberg, Vermont
Houses Backs Wide Rights For Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2000, at Al. A "civil
union" would involve virtually all of the rights, privileges, and responsibilities associated
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III. CHALLENGING DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP BENEFITS POLICIES
UNDER STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
STATUTES
Limited domestic partnership benefits policies may violate
federal, state, or local employment discrimination statutes. Several
variables emerge in analyzing benefits under those provisions.
Laws vary by jurisdiction, with certain types of discrimination
illegal in some states and localities but not in other jurisdictions.
Also, the type of discrimination at issue can vary depending on the
terms of a particular policy." Most significantly with respect to
state and local discrimination laws, the federal Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) may preempt the application of
those laws to a benefits plan.
This part first traces the steps in determining whether ERISA
preempts. It demonstrates how ERISA largely preempts the
application of state and local laws to benefits plans. Next, this part
considers whether state and local statutes prohibiting marital
status or sexual orientation discrimination-assuming that ERISA
does not preempt them-may preclude limited benefits policies. It
concludes that those statutes have little or no applicability because
they are narrow in scope and do not address the type of discrimina-
tion (sex) presented by the terms of most limited policies. With
respect to sexual orientation, this part examines the decision in
Ayyoub v. City of Oakland,5 which held that a domestic partnership
benefits policy available only to "gay and lesbian" employees
constituted illegal sexual orientation discrimination.
A. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Pre-
empts State and Local Discrimination Laws in Most Cases
In many jurisdictions, state and local employment discrimina-
tion laws prohibit more types of discrimination than does federal
law. Somejurisdictions, for instance, prohibit discrimination based
on marital status or sexual orientation, whereas such discrimina-
with marriage. See id. Nonetheless, it would not be a "marriage" in name or under the law.
"[Tihe public is readier to bless stable gay relationships--so long as those relationships are
not called 'marriages.'" Jonathan Rauch, What's Wrong with "Marriage Lite," WALL ST. J.,
June 2, 1998, at A22.
44. Compare infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the terms of the domestic partnership policy
at issue in Ayyoub v. City of Oakland) with infra text accompanying notes 125, 132, 158
(discussing the more common terms of domestic partner policies).
45. No. 99-02937 (Cal. State Labor Comm'r Oct. 27, 1997).
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tion in employment remains legal under federal law. State and
local laws prohibiting marital status or sexual orientation discrimi-
nation may be viewed by some parties as bases on which to
challenge limited domestic partnership benefits policies." Even if
those types of discrimination occur in a policy, ERISA most likely
preempts the application of state and local discrimination laws to
most benefits plans. It therefore forces parties to rely on federal
law in raising discrimination claims. As a result of its broad
preemptive effect, ERISA preemption should be the starting point
in any analysis of domestic partnership benefits.
With only a few exceptions, ERISA preempts "any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan."7 This provision preempts application of state and
local laws to a benefit provided as part of employment if that
benefit is part of a benefit plan covered by ERISA. The first
determination in the preemption analysis should be whether ERISA
covers a particular type of benefit provided by what the statute
defines as a covered "employee benefitplan." It defines "employee
benefit plan" as "an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee
pension benefit plan."49 The definitions of these terms list the types
of benefits covered by ERISA. An "employee pension benefit plan"
provides retirement or deferred income.' An "employee welfare
benefit plan" provides "through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise ... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or
46. For instance, in Foray v. Bell Atlantic, the plaintiff initially filed suit in a New York
supreme court contending that his employer's domestic partnership benefits policy
discriminated against him based on marital status and sexual orientation as prohibited by
state and local laws. See Foray v. Bell At., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Bell
Atlantic removed the case to federal court on the ground that ERISA covered the plan and
preempted the state and local laws, so that the case involved federal subject matter
jurisdiction. See id. Foray voluntarily dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(1)i). He later filed a new complaint in federal court alleging sex
discrimination under Title VII. See id.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). ERISA further defines state laws as"laws, decisions, rule,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law." Id. § 1144(c)(1). It also provides
that [tlhe term 'State' includes any State of the United States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, and the Canal Zone."
Id. § 1002(10). Although the statute refers only to "State laws," and the definition of "State"
only includes states and United States territories, courts have interpreted the preemption
provision to include local ordinances. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149,1177-80 (N.D. Cal. 1998); see also Bond v. Trustees of STA-ILA
Pension Fund, 902 F. Supp. 650, 655 (D. Md. 1995) (holding a local ordinance prohibiting
marital status discrimination preempted with respect to ERISA-covered plan as "well within
the type of provision which ERISA's framers intended to pre-empt").
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
49. Id. § 1002(3).
50. I& § 1002(2).
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benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other
training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or
prepaid legal services."5 ' Health-related benefits, such as medical,
dental, and vision care coverage, are the types of benefits most
commonly included in domestic partnership benefits policies. The
above list clearly encompasses those benefits, as well as the
main-and most valuable-types of benefits offered by employers
that provide any benefits. Overall, the types of benefits covered by
ERISA are numerous. Despite ERISA's breadth, it does not cover
all types of benefits. A type of benefit not listed within the statute's
definitions of employee benefit plans is not covered by ERISA, and
state and local law can apply to that benefit.52
ERISA preemption does not arise merely because a benefit falls
within the statute's broad list of types of covered benefits. Preemp-
tion results only if an ERISA-covered benefit also is part of a benefit
plan5" and that plan, in turn, is covered by ERISA. The next
analytical step thus concerns whether the benefit is part of a benefit
"plan." The term "plan" has been construed by the Supreme
Court." Holding that Congress intended ERISA's preemption
provision "to afford employers the advantages of a uniform set of
administrative procedures governed by a single set of regulations
.... [and that] [oinly a plan embodies a set of administrative
practices vulnerable to the burden that would be imposed by a
patchwork scheme of regulation,"' the Supreme Court concluded
that Congress's concern implicated only "benefits whose provision
by nature requires an ongoing administrative program to meet the
employer's obligation."M The definition of "plan" therefore reduces
to whether an employer operates an "ongoing administrative
program" 7 to provide a covered type of benefit. The number of
51. Id. § 1002(1). The definition also includes any benefit described in 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)
(1994). See id. That section describes essentially the same benefits as does 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1).
52. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1173-74. For example, "membership
or membership discounts, moving expenses and travel benefits are not among those benefits
listed in [ERISA's definitions of employee benefit plans." Id. at 1173 (citations omitted).
53. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 7 (1987) ("ERISA's pre-emption
provision does not refer to state laws relating to 'employee benefits,' but to state laws relating
to 'employee benefit plans'...." (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a))).
54. See id. at 8 ("Mhe terms 'employee benefit plan' and 'plan' are defined only
tautologically in the statute ....
55. Id. at 11-12.
56. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
57. "An employer that makes a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits
undertakes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating
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benefits that do not require an "ongoing administrative program-
i.e., a plan-most likely is small.5"
Due to the fact that benefits covered by ERISA most likely are
part of a "plan" as that term has been construed, the final question
is whether a plan is covered by ERISA. Most types of plans are
covered, as the statute exempts only a few types.5" Of those
exemptions, the exception for governmental plans is particularly
significant.6" State and local governments employ considerable
numbers of people, and a noticeable number of governmental
employers have adopted domestic partnership benefits policies. 1
As governmental plans are not covered by ERISA, state and local
laws may be applied to those plans.
If, as is most likely the situation, a type of benefit is covered by
ERISA and it exists under an ERISA-covered plan, the final step in
benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit
payments, and keeping appropriate records...." I& at 9. Fort Halifax Packing Co. u. Coyne
concerned a state law mandating that employers pay a one-time severance payment to
employees in the event of closing or relocation of operations. See id. at 3-4. The Supreme
Court held that the mandated severance pay benefit did not result in the operation of a plan
under ERISA. "The requirement of a one-time, lump-sum payment triggered by a single
event requires no administrative scheme whatsoever to meet the employer's obligation....
To do little more than write a check hardly constitutes the operation of a benefit plan." Id.
at 12 (citations omitted).
58. In Air Transportation Association of America v. City and County of San Francisco,
a local ordinance mandated that city contractors not discriminate between spouses and
domestic partners in providing benefits. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City and County of
San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 1998). The ordinance provided a "non-
exclusive illustrative" list of benefits that included bereavement leave, family medical leave,
health benefits, membership and membership discounts, moving expenses, pension and
retirement benefits, and travel benefits. See id. Among those benefits, the court concluded
that only moving expenses-which are not even a benefit covered by ERISA--"appear" to fall
into the category of benefits that do not require an "ongoing administrative program." Id.
at 1169.
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1994). The five main exceptions are: (1) governmental plans;
(2) church plans; (3) plans maintained solely to comply with workers' compensation,
unemployment compensation, or disability insurance laws; (4) plans maintained outside of
the United States primarily for the benefit of persons substantially all of whom are
nonresident aliens; and (5) excess benefit plans that are unfunded. See id. § 1003(b); see also
id. §§ 1051, 1081, 1101 (exempting additional types of plans from specific sections of the
statute).
60. "The term 'governmental plan' means a plan established or maintained for its
employees by the Government of the United States, by the government of any State or
political subdivision thereof, or by an agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing." Id.
§ 1002(32).
61. See supra note 2. Several public employers that provide domestic partnership
benefits have limited those benefits to employees in same-sex partnerships. See, e.g.,
American Association for Single People, Governments Extending Health Benefits to Domestic
Partners (visited May 12,2000) <http/www.singlesrights.com/dp-hlth.html> (identifying 13
public employers, including the cities of Chicago, Denver, New Orleans, Baltimore,
Philadelphia, and Tucson).
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determining whether state and local laws can be applied to that
benefit is whether the law "relate[s] to" the plan. 2 In nearly all
circumstances, state and local discrimination laws most likely
"relate to" a plan and therefore would be preempted by ERISA. In
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.," the Supreme Court broadly
interpreted the "relate to" phrase in ERISA's preemption
provision." The Court held that ERISA preempted the application
of New York's Human Rights Law to require employers not to
discriminate in their ERISA-covered plans on the basis of preg-
nancy. The Court concluded that the antidiscrimination law
"clearly" related to ERISA plans because it mandated how employ-
ers structured their benefit plans and required "employers to pay
employees specific benefits."' The Supreme Court's broad interpre-
tation of ERISA's preemption provision continued in subsequent
cases. In recent years, the Court has rejected a "strictly literal
reading" of that provision and adopted a more flexible approach."
Yet, even in shifting to its current more flexible approach, the Court
reaffirmed its holding in Shaw."1 The application of state and local
discrimination laws to compel ERISA-covered plans to provide
benefits to additional employees with domestic partners would
62. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1144(a) (2000).
63. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
64. See i& at 96-97 ("A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of
the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." (citations omitted)). Such
"connection with or reference to" an ERISA plan need not be direct. "[A) state law might
produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an
ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage... and that such a state law
might indeed be pre-empted ... ." New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995).
65. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97. At the time of events at issue in Shaw, federal law under Title
VII did not prohibit pregnancy discrimination. See id. at 88-89. The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 subsequently added such discrimination to Title VIrs prohibition
against sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
66. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Serv. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 813 (1997).
The Court's current approach begins with the presumption that Congress does not intend to
supplant state law in fields of traditional state regulation unless it clearly manifests the
intent to do so. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-55. If this presumption is overcome, whether
a law relates to an ERISA plan depends on "'if it 1) has a connection with or 2) a reference
to (the] plan.' California Div. of Laber Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316,324 (1997) (citations omitted). The ultimate inquiry is "whether the state
law at issue, although clearly within the scope of traditional state police powers, so directly
and substantially regulates the content of employee benefit plans as to run afoul of ERISA's
goals of national uniformity." Fisk, supra note 3, at 291.
67. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657. Although the Supreme Court has retreated from a
literal application of ERISA's preemption provision, only two justices have declared their
willingness to abandon entirely the approach employed in Shaw. See Dillingham, 519 U.S.
at 334-36 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
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result in "mandat[ing] employee benefit structures."68 Therefore,
ERISA still most likely preempts the application of state and local
discrimination statutes to ERISA-covered plans, and those laws
then could not be used to challenge discrimination in domestic
partnership benefits provided through ERISA-covered plans.
When ERISA preempts state and local discrimination laws,
federal law delimits the types of prohibited discrimination. An
individual then must look to federal employment discrimination
statutes, such as Title VII,69 for protection from discrimination by
an ERISA-covered plan. The only other possible provisions that
may prohibit discrimination by an ERISA-covered plan are the
terms of the plan itself.70
B. Marital Status Discrimination
Statutes that prohibit employment discrimination because of
marital status at first may appear to offer a strong basis for
challenging the denial of domestic partner benefits to employees in
unmarried opposite-sex relationships. Employers with limited
benefits policies justify the limitation on the ground that employees
in opposite-sex relationships have the ability to marry in order to
receive couples' benefits.7' Any employee in a domestic partnership
could argue plausibly that she suffers marital status discrimination
when her employer denies couples' benefits to her and her partner
because they have the status of being legally unmarried to each
other. In the case of opposite-sex couples, employers may be
perceived as essentially penalizing an employee for the decision of
68. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658. Under the Supreme Court's more flexible approach to
ERISA preemption, state regulations have escaped preemption even if they had a relation
to an ERISA plan as long as they did not "bind plan administrators to any particular choice
and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself." Id. at 659; see also Dillingham,
519 U.S. at 332 ("[The apprenticeship portion of the prevailing wage statute does not bind
ERISA plans to anything. No apprenticeship program is required by California law to meet
California's standards.").
69. Federal employment discrimination statutes serve as a baseline standard. State and
local discrimination laws may be applied to an ERISA-covered plan insofar as the same
discrimination is illegal under federal law. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 105-06.
70. See Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (refusing to apply an
employer's nondiscrimination policy on marital status and sexual orientation discrimination
to sickness death benefits under an ERISA plan because those provisions were not part of
the terms of the plan). ERISA does not mandate any particular benefits, nor does the statute
contain any prohibitions against discrimination in benefits. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91; see
also McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401,407 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Congress did not intend
that ERISA circumscribe employers' control over the content of benefits plans they offered
to their employees.").
71. See Foray v. Bell Atl., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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her and her partner not to marry. Yet, regardless of how clear the
case of marital status discrimination may seem, several obstacles
hinder-and likely foreclose-the use of marital status discrimina-
tion statutes to challenge discrimination in domestic partner
benefits.
The first obstacle is that limited domestic partner policies do
not classify employees in domestic partnerships as eligible or
ineligible for domestic partner benefits based on marital status.
Domestic partnership is a substitute for marriage or an alternative
to it. Accordingly, any couple in a domestic partnership--regard-
less of legal ability or inability to marry-is unmarried. As all
employees in domestic partnerships have the same marital status,
discrimination based on marital status is not present. Limited
domestic partner benefits policies take the class of unmarried
employees in domestic partnerships and, for purposes of domestic
partner benefits eligibility, divide that class into eligible and
ineligible groups on some basis other than marital status. The
distinguishing characteristic can vary between different employers'
policies, but most likely it is either sex or sexual orientation.
Even assuming that opposite-sex couples suffer disparate
treatment based on marital status, other factors limit the applica-
bility of marital status discrimination protections. Most signifi-
cantly, as discussed above, ERISA most likely preempts the
application of state and local marital status discrimination statutes
to private employers' ERISA-covered.benefits plans.72
In addition, employment discrimination on the basis of marital
status remains legal in most jurisdictions. At present, only twenty-
one states and the District of Columbia prohibit such discrimination
to some degree. 73 Furthermore, even if a jurisdiction has a statute
prohibiting marital status discrimination, the statute by its terms
72. See supra Part III.A (discussing ERISA preemption).
73. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 1998); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1992);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §
1-2512 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1993); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 6/1-102 (West 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16 (1998); MIcH. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1991);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 354-kA.7 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (Consol. 1995);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
715 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
111.321 (West 1997). Indiana prohibits marital status discrimination in the employment of
teachers. See IND. CODE ANN. § 20-6.1-6-11 (Michie 1997). Federal law does not prohibit
marital status discrimination. See, e.g., Coleman v. B-G Maintenance Management of
Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that Title VII prohibits
discrimination against married men or women, but does not protect marital status alone).
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may not cover employee benefits. Some marital status discrimina-
tion statutes exempt employee benefits. 4 Finally, even if a law is
not preempted by ERISA and does not exempt benefits, it still may
not provide protection with respect to a domestic partnership. 75
C. Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Statutes that prohibit sexual orientation employment discrimi-
nation are unlikely to provide a basis for challenging limited
domestic partner benefits policies. As will be discussed below,
however, all of the factors that could prevent the application of
sexual orientation discrimination statutes to such policies were
absent in Ayyoub v. City of Oakland.7M Ayyoub is the only decision
thus far to find illegal discrimination based on sexual orientation in
a domestic partner benefits policy.
77
1. The Limited Utility of Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Statutes
As discussed above, the primary obstacle to using sexual
orientation discrimination statutes is that ERISA most likely
preempts their application to private employers' ERISA covered
benefits plans.7
8
Another difficulty is the limited reach of sexual orientation
discrimination statutes. Presently, only twelve states and the
District of Columbia prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in
employment. 79  Additionally, even if a statute prohibits sexual
74. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(c) (Michie 1998) (permitting an employer to
provide greater benefits to an employee with a spouse or child); CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 12940(aX3)(B) (West 1992) (same); MONT. CODE § 49-2-303(d)(5) (1999) (same).
75. 'We do not find that a domestic partnership is a 'marital status' within [the New York
State Human Rights Law].' Funderburke v. Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 676 N.Y.S.2d
199, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). Funderburke rejected a claim of marital status
discrimination against a public school district that refused to provide domestic partner
benefits to employees in unmarried relationships. See id.
76. No. 99-02937 (Cal. State Labor Comm'r Oct. 27, 1997).
77. See Ayyoub, No. 99-02937, slip op. at 4.
78. See supra Part III.A.
79. See CAL. Gov'r CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a
(West 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1993); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 11B, § 4 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 2000); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (Michie Supp. 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-k7 (Supp. 1999);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 28-5-7 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 495 (Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(lXd) (West 1997). The Oregon Court ofAppeals
has interpreted Oregon's employment discrimination statute, which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of the sex of any other person with whom an individual associates, to encompass
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orientation discrimination, employee benefits may be exempt from
the statute.80
In any event, in most cases, sexual orientation is not the proper
basis on which to base a claim of discrimination in domestic partner
benefits. As individuals in opposite-sex relationships are most
likely heterosexual and individuals in same-sex relationships are
most likely gay or lesbian, the exclusion of employees in opposite-
sex-relationships from eligibility for domestic partnership benefits
may appear at first to be sexual orientation discrimination."1 This
assumption is not necessarily correct for two reasons. First, the
existence of a domestic partnership (or, for that matter, a lawful
marriage) and the respective sexes of the parties do not ipso facto
accurately indicate the respective sexual orientations of the parties.
Sexual orientation refers to sexual desire or conduct, whereas
domestic partnership denotes a committed relationship founded
upon a living arrangement. A sexual, or even romantic, relation-
ship may not be an element of a domestic partnership, just as a
sexual or romantic relationship may not be part of a marriage.
Thus, "same-sex" and "gay" or "lesbian" are not necessarily
synonymous terms, just as "opposite-sex" and "heterosexual" are
not interchangeable terms."2 Second, looking to the eligibility terms
sexual orientation discrimination. See Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d
435, 441-42 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (interpreting OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030(1)(b) (Supp. 1998)).
Federal employment discrimination statutes do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir.
1979) ("W~e conclude that Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination applies only to
discrimination on the basis of gender and should not be extended to include sexual preference
such as homosexuality.").
80. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-2.1 (West 1993) (providing that the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination shall not be construed to interfere with any bona fide retirement,
pension, employee benefit, or insurance plan or program).
81. For instance, in Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 21 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the
plaintiff challenged the City of Chicago's policy of allowing family leave to unmarried
employees only if they are in same-sex domestic partnerships as sex discrimination under
Title VII. See id. at 861. The district court assumed that the claim alleged sexual
orientation, rather than sex, discrimination. 'Mr. Cleaves' claim could be read to state a
claim for discrimination based on his heterosexual sexual orientation; that is, as a
heterosexual in a relationship he does not have the same rights as a homosexual in a
relationship." Id. The ordinance under which such leave was granted, however, made no
mention of sexual orientation and instead required that domestic partners be, inter alia, "the
same sex." CHICAGO, ILL CODE § 2-152-072 (effective May 16, 1997). Because sexual
orientation employment discrimination is not prohibited by federal law, the court dismissed
that claim. See Cleaves, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 861. It later granted a motion for reconsideration,
allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint, and issued a new opinion. See Cleaves v.
City of Chicago, 68 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
82. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.l (Haw. 1993).
"Homosexual" and "same-sex" marriages are not synonymous; by the same
token, a "heterosexual" same-sex marriage is, in theory, not oxymoronic. A
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of domestic partner benefits policies, most plans fail to make any
direct reference to sexual orientation.' The eligibility criteria of
most limited policies simply require that the members of a couple
be of the same sex."4 The explicit terms of a benefits policy can
provide the direct evidence to establish a claim of disparate
treatment. Therefore, when a policy's terms explicitly reference sex
in limiting eligibility but make no reference to sexual orientation,
a claim of sex discrimination affords the strongest basis for
challenging discrimination in the domestic partner benefits policy.
2. Ayyoub v. City of Oakland'
Ayyoub v. City of Oakland was a rare case that overcame all of
the obstacles to the application of a state sexual orientation
discrimination statute to a domestic partner benefits policy. First,
the case arose in a state with a statute prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." Second, the case
involved a local government as the employer, so ERISA did not
preempt state employment discrimination law.8" Furthermore, the
benefits policy expressly based eligibility on an employee's actual or
perceived sexual orientation.8 Ayyoub is instructive as the only
case to find sexual orientation or any other type of prohibited
discrimination in a domestic partner benefits policy. The decision
also is significant for its rejection of the argument that limited
domestic partner benefit policies are legally justifiable because they
"homosexual" person is defined as "one sexually attracted to another of the
same sex." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English
Language 680 (1989). Conversely, "heterosexuality" is "sexual attraction for
one of the opposite sex," Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary at 827, or
'sexual feeling or behavior directed toward a person or persons of the opposite
sex." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary for the English Language
at 667. Parties to a "a union between a man and a woman" may or may not be
homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either
homosexuals or heterosexuals.
Id. See generally BRENDA MADDOX, MARRIED AND GAY (1982) (describing the lives of
homosexual people living in opposite-sex marriages). Additionally, the possibility remains
that a member of any opposite-sex or same-sex couple may be bisexual.
83. See KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 39-111 (providing copies of 26 employer policies, none
of which have any reference to sexual orientation).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 125, 132, 158.
85. No. 99-02937 (Cal. State Labor Comm'r Oct. 27 1997).
86. See CAL LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 2000) (repealed 2000).
87. See supra note 59.
88. See Ayyoub, No. 99-02937, slip op. at 3.
20001 583
584 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 6:561
simply serve to "level the playing field" and cure discrimination in
marriage laws. 9
Ayyoub was an administrative decision by the California State
Labor Commissioner' ° under the Commissioner's law enforcement
authority to enforce provisions of the California Labor Code that
prohibit discrimination in employment. 91 In 1993, the City of
Oakland extended vision and dental benefits plans to the domestic
partners of city employees.92 The terms of the policy defined a
domestic partnership as
Ua relationship between two cohabitating, unmarried and
unrelated people, regardless ofgender, who, being over 18 years
of age, have resided together for at least six... months prior to
the filing of a Declaration of Domestic Partnership form, and
who share responsibility for the common living expenses of food,
shelter, and medical care."'
The express terms of this policy were neutral as to the sexes of the
members of a domestic partnership and the terms made no
reference to sexual orientation.
Effective January 1, 1997, Oakland extended health benefits to
the domestic partners of city employees, with the City contributing
toward the premiums for such coverage. 4 But, unlike the sex-
neutral and sexual orientation-neutral eligibility criteria estab-
lished earlier for dental and vision benefits, Oakland limited health
benefits to only some domestic partners. 5 The resolution approved
89. See id. at2.
90. The decision was administrative and not reviewed by any court, so the decision is not
binding law. It is, however, persuasive authority.
91. At the time of Ayyoub, the California State Labor Commissioner had authority to
investigate complaints of sexual orientation discrimination. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.7,
1102.1 (West Supp. 2000) (repealed 2000). The California Labor Code prohibited
"discrimination of different treatment in any aspect of employment... based on actual or
perceived sexual orientation." Id. § 1102.1. Effective January 1, 2000, California repealed
that provision, but continued its prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination in
employment within the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. See CAL GOV'r CODE
§ 12900 (West 1992); 1999 Cal. Stat. 592 §1 (expressing legislative intent to incorporate the
Labor Code provision within the California Fair Employment and Housing Act and to deem
any conduct that violated the Labor Code provision a violation of the successor provision).
Jurisdiction over complaints of sexual orientation employment discrimination under
California law now rests with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing.
See CAL GOV'r CODE § 12930(f)(1) (West 1992).
92. See Ayyoub, No. 99-02937, slip op. at 1.
93. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting City of Oakland's 1993 domestic partner benefits
policy).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 3-4.
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by the City Council was clear as to how employees in domestic
partnerships would be classified for eligibility.96 It stated that the
City would provide medical coverage "for the domestic partners and
eligible dependents ofgay and lesbian employees."97 The policy thus
expressly based eligibility on sexual orientation. As far as determin-
ing the sexual orientation of an employee who applied for domestic
partner benefits, the City apparently relied only on the respective
sexes of an employee and her domestic partner as conclusive proof."'
California law prohibits an employer from inquiring into an
employee's sexual orientation.9 Yet, under the policy's explicit
96. See id.
97. Oakland City Council Resolution No. 73024 (Oct. 29, 1996) (emphasis added). The
resolution also declared that "the City wishes to provide benefits of employment for its gay
and lesbian employees equal with those benefits extended to heterosexual employees who are
afforded the legal opportunity to marry." Id. (emphasis added). Most likely, the City would
be unable to demonstrate how marriage laws facially deny any individual the ability to marry
because of sexual orientation. Marriage laws require that the parties to a marriage be of
opposite sexes; the law does not know nor care about their sexual orientations in granting
or denying an individual the ability to marry a particular person. See Brause v. Bureau of
Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998)
(recognizing that prohibition on same-sex marriage involves an obvious sex-based
classification); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993) (holding that Hawaii's marriage
law "on its face" based the ability to marry on sex by denying same-sex couples access to the
marital status); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Vermont law
classifies couples based on sex by distinguishing between "opposite-sex couples" and "same-
sex couples" in providing benefits and protections incident to marriage); see also Baehr, 852
P.2d at 51 n.11 ('Homosexual' and 'same-sex' marriages are not synonymous; by the same
token, a 'heterosexual' same-sex marriage is, in theory, not oxymoronic.... Parties to 'a
union between a man and a woman' may or may not be homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex
marriage could theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals.").
98. "Complainant applied for coverage for his domestic partner, but was denied the
coverage because his partner was not of the same gender as he. [The City's] position is that
the policy extending medical benefits only applies to same-sex domestic partners." Ayyoub,
No. 99-02937, slip op. at 1 (emphasis added). In a bulletin to employees announcing the
availabilityofthe domestic partnership health benefits, the City of Oakland's Administrative
Services Agency stated that the new benefits "will allow active employees to cover their
same-sex domestic partners." CITY OF OAKLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE BULLETIN ON MEDICAL
OPEN ENROLLMENT FOR NON-PERS PRUDENTIAL PRUCARE HMO 1 (effective Nov. 1, 1996)
(emphasis added) (on file with author). As proof of eligibility for enrollment, the bulletin
stated, "[elmployees must provide a Certificate of Domestic Partnership in order to enroll
their same-sex domestic partner in the medical plan." Id at 2 (emphasis added). In other
words, a male plus a male equaled "gay," a female plus a female equaled "lesbian," and a
male and a female equaled "heterosexual." Oakland's policy discriminated on the basis of sex
in the application of that policy by providing benefits only to employees in same-sex couples.
99. See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., No. A052157, 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 1241, at
**35-37 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1991). The California legislature codified the holding of
Soroka. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1. (West Supp. 2000) (repealed 2000); see also 1992 Cal.
Stat. 915 § 1 ("The purpose of this act is to codify the court decisions in... Soroka v. Dayton
Hudson Corp .... prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation."). Soroka's holding
continues in effect under current California statutes prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination in employment. See CAL GOVT CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 2000); see also
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terms limiting benefits to "gay and lesbian employees," an em-
ployee's "actual or perceived sexual orientation"'0° (however the
City determined it) was the basis for determining whether an
employee could receive health benefits for her domestic partner.
Majid (Mickey) Ayyoub, a city public works engineer, submitted
a Declaration of Domestic Partnership in 1995 for himself and his
female domestic partner, Sandra Washburn.' The City extended
dental and vision care benefits to Washburn. 0 2 After the City
extended health benefits to domestic partners, Ayyoub applied for
medical coverage for Washburn. The City denied the application
because Ayyoub's "partner was not the same gender as he." °3
After pursuing a complaint through the City's internal
discrimination complaint process, Ayyoub filed a discrimination
complaint with the Labor Commissioner alleging discrimination on
the basis of his sexual orientation.'"° The City responded to
Ayyoub's complaint with the "level the playing field" argument
typically used to justify the exclusion of opposite-sex couples from
domestic partnership policies.'0 5 By enacting a policy limited to gay
and lesbian employees, the City argued,
Now all employees who have intimate life partners have the
opportunity to have the City pay the medical premium for that
partner: the distinction between heterosexuals and homosexual
employees is that heterosexual employees, having the right to
marry, must exercise that right demonstrating the long-held
social approbation of marriage as an index of commitment and
presumed familial stability. Homosexuals, denied the opportu-
nity to marry, have no right to exercise: however, they are no
longer penalized by the City for being denied an opportunity to
marry based on their sexual orientation. The bottom line is
that the City's practice... remedies discrimination rather than
creates it.'06
1999 Cal. Stat. 592 § 1 ("As was the intent of Section 1102.1 of the Labor Code, as that
section read on December 31, 1999, this act is intended to codify the court decision in ...
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp .... prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.").
100. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1.
101. See Ayyoub, No. 99-0237, slip op. at 1.
102. See id. at 1.
103. Id.
104. See Discrimination Complaint of Majid Yacoub Ayyoub to the Cal. State Labor
Comm'r, Ayyoub v. City of Oakland (No. 99-0237) (filed Apr. 24, 1997) (on file with author).
As remedies, Ayyoub requested that the Labor Commissioner order Oakland to "[p]rovide
equal access to employment benefits and reimburse additional costs I have incurred to
provide medical benefits for my domestic partner as of 1/1/97." Id.
105. See Ayyoub, No. 99-02937, slip op. at 2.
106. Id. (quoting the City of Oakland's response to Ayyoub's complaint).
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Ayyoub, on the other hand, contended that the policy denied him a
benefit available to "other similarly-situated employees, solely
because of his sexual orientation."" The similarly situated
employees would be the entire class of legally unmarried employees
in domestic partner relationships.
The Labor Commissioner concluded that Oakland's domestic
partner health benefits policy constituted discrimination based on
sexual orientation.08 There was no dispute that sexual orientation
was the criterion for determining eligibility.0 9 The City, however,
offered two justifications that it claimed rendered its policy non-
discriminatory. First, as mentioned, it argued that "the policy was
enacted to remedy historic discrimination against gay and lesbian
employees, who cannot ordinarily obtain insurance coverage for
their partners because they cannot legally marry. 110 Second, the
City asserted that "[Ayyoub] and other heterosexual employees can
obtain equal benefits simply by exercising their right to marry their
partners.""'
The Labor Commissioner rejected both arguments as failing to
address the discriminatory force of Oakland's benefits policy. The
decision stated,
The fact that [the City] enacted the policy in order to address
historic discrimination against gay and lesbian workers, while
laudable, has no bearing on the question of whether the policy,
as enacted and applied, does in itself discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation. And [the City's] contention that heterosex-
ual employees could marry, and thereby obtain equivalent
benefits, begs the question. [Ayyoub's] argument is that he
should not have to be married to obtain the same employment
benefits as an unmarried co-worker of a different sexual orienta-
tion. 112
The Labor Commissioner noted that Oakland had created a
domestic partnership registration scheme that was "neutral with
respect to sexual orientation""' 3 and defined domestic partners "as
107. Id.
108. See id. at 3-4.
109. See id. at 3. (W(The City] acknowledges that sexual orientation is a factor-indeed,
the determining factor-in determining whether an employee is eligible for employer paid
medical insurance benefits covering a domestic partner.*).
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id
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two cohabitating people, regardless of gender, who meet certain
criteria."" The City also provided vision and dental benefits to all
registered domestic partners of employees for several years "in a
manner which does not differentiate based on the sexual orientation
of the partners.""' The decision concluded: "Having created the
gender and orientation-neutral category of 'domestic partner,' [the
City] has offered no legitimate explanation for offering certain
employment benefits to some domestic partners and not others.""'
The Labor Commissioner therefore concluded that Oakland's policy
of providing domestic partner benefits only to "gay and lesbian"
employees (at least as perceived by the City based on the fact that
an employee and her domestic partner were of the same sex)
constituted illegal sexual orientation discrimination under
California law." 7
Although only an administrative decision and based only on
California law, Ayyoub is instructive. It is the only decision thus far
to hold that a limited domestic partner benefits policy constituted
illegal employment discrimination. In its analysis,Ayyoub precisely
identified the class of similarly situated employees at issue with
respect to domestic partners benefits policies. The relevant class is
all unmarried employees in domestic partnerships, not simply the
subclass of those employees who cannot legally marry their
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 3-4.
117. See id. at 4. As a remedy, the Labor Commissioner ordered Oakland to extend health
benefits to "all registered domestic partners" of city employees. See Order, Ayyoub v. City
of Oakland, No. 99-02937 (Cal. State Labor Comm'r Oct. 27, 1997). As permitted by the
California Labor Code, Oakland filed an administrative appeal with the Director of the
California Department of Industrial Relations. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.7(e) (West 1989). The
Director summarily affirmed the Labor Commissioner's decision as supported by substantial
evidence. See Ayyoub v. City of Oakland, No. 99-02937 (Cal. Dir. of Industrial Relations Nov.
14, 1997). Afterward, Oakland refused to comply with the Labor Commissioner's decision
and order, causing the Labor Commissioner to threaten legal action to compel compliance.
See Pamela Burdman, Oakland Faces Legal Fight Over Partners Benefits, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Dec. 3, 1997, at A17, available in 1997 WL 6712250. Finally, acknowledging that
challenging the Labor Commissioner's decision would be "protracted, costly, and not
conducive to harmonious labor relations," the Oakland City Council amended the City's
policy and extended health benefits paid by the City to all domestic partners of city
employees effective July 1, 1998. See Oakland City Council Resolution No. 74174 (Apr. 21,
1998). The Labor Commissioner determined that this modification brought Oakland into
compliance with the California Labor Code. See Letter from Anne Hipshman, Staff Counsel
to Labor Commissioner, to Wendy P. Reuder, Deputy City Attorney, City of Oakland 2 (Oct.
2, 1998) (on file with author). Subsequently, Oakland complied with the order to reimburse
Ayyoub for costs incurred as a result of the denial of medical benefits. See Settlement
Agreement Between City of Oakland and Majid Ayyoub and Release of Claims Against City
by Majid Ayyoub (Dec. 17, 1998) (on file with author).
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domestic partners under state law."1 8 Once an employer ceases to
use the existence of a legal marriage as the sine qua non for
eligibility for particular benefits, marriage or the ability to marry
ceases to be the basis for classifying employees as eligible or
ineligible for the benefits at issue. All domestic partners, by
definition and regardless of the legal ability to marry, are unmar-
ried. As Ayyoub demonstrates, when an employer segregates the
broad class of unmarried domestic partners by the sexes or the
actual or perceived sexual orientations of the members of domestic
partnerships, illegal discrimination can result. Thus, an effort to
correct discrimination in marriage laws can itself create a new type
of discrimination.
As a matter of California employment discrimination law,
Ayyoub rejected the idea of the "level the playing field argument" as
a legitimate reason for providing domestic partnership benefits to
only some employees in unmarried domestic partnerships.11 9
Instead of focusing on whether a policy can be said to remedy
historic discrimination in society, 120 Ayyoub properly refocused the
inquiry on whether an individual employer's policy-or "rem-
edy"-itself discriminates against employees on a particular
impermissible basis. As for the argument that opposite-sex (or,
under the Oakland policy, 'heterosexual") couples can simply get
married to obtain benefits, Ayyoub cast that argument as an
evasion of the real question at hand, which is why some unmarried
employees are eligible for couples' benefits while other unmarried
employees are not. Ayyoub looked at the basis for such discrimina-
tion rather than any asserted justification, however praiseworthy
it may be. Discrimination based on sexual orientation was still
illegal discrimination, as it relied on a factor that California
intended to eliminate as a factor in employment decisions. The
result in Ayyoub left opposite-sex couples eligible to obtain spousal
benefits or domestic partnership benefits and same-sex couples
eligible for domestic partnership benefits. Opposite-sex couples
may be eligible for two types of benefits now, but the result is equal
because both types of couples are eligible for couples' benefits--and
without any discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived
sexual orientation or sex.
118. See Ayyoub, No. 99-02937, slip op. at 3-4.
119. See id.
120. After all, an employer has no obligation to follow marriage laws in providing couples'
benefits, so it therefore need not impose the discrimination found in those laws and then
have a need to "remedy" it.
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WV. DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS PLANS LIMITED TO SAME-SEX
COUPLES UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964121
As discussed above, federal law occupies the field as far as.
prohibiting discrimination in ERISA-covered plans.'22 It also may
be applied to other employee benefits as well. Federal employment
discrimination statutes prohibit fewer types of discrimination than
do many state or local laws. The main federal employment
discrimination statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any individual
with respect to... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.""z This provision applies to employee benefits.'24
Domestic partner benefits policies that are limited to employees
in same-sex relationships, in basing eligibility on an employee's sex
as it compares to the sex of her respective domestic partner,
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. Nearly all domestic
partner benefits policies that limit eligibility to employees in same-
sex couples expressly require that an employee and her partner be
"the same sex" or "the same gender." 2 ' These criteria base
eligibility for domestic partner benefits on an employee's sex vis-h-
vis the sex of her domestic partner. Sex is unmistakably the
determinative factor in deciding eligibility. A change in the sex of
an employee's domestic partner changes the result. Under policies
limited to employees in same-sex couples, an employee would be
granted domestic partner benefits if the employee is a male and has
a male domestic partner, or if the employee is a female and has a
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
122. See supra Part II1A
123. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
124. "Health insurance and other fringe benefits" constitute "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" under Title VII. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983). Pension or deferred compensation benefits,
even though received after employment ends, also are covered by the statute. See Arizona
Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1079 (1983). Because Title VII prohibits sex
discrimination, a state or local statute prohibiting sex discrimination also can be applied to
an employee benefits plan covered by ERISA. See supra note 69.
125. See, e.g., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company, in KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 68 ("We are of the same sex. . . ."); American
Express Company Affidavit of Domestic Partnership, in KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 61 ("We
are the same gender."); Apple Computer Domestic Partner Affidavit, in Kohn, supra note 1,
app. at 53 ('I certify that the person named below is my domestic partner of the same sex.
.); Lotus Development Corporation Affidavit of Spousal Equivalency, in KOHN, supra note
1, app. at 54 ("We are of the same sex .... "); The New York Times Certificate of Domestic
Partnership, in KOHN, supra note 1, app. at 85 ('[W]e are the same sex .... "). None of these
policies make any reference to sexual orientation.
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female domestic partner. But, change the combinations so that the
male employee has a female domestic partner, or so that the female
employee has a male domestic partner. With the latter couples, the
sexes of the employees are the same, but the sexes of the employees'
respective domestic partners have changed. The latter couples
would be denied domestic partner benefits because the domestic
partners are of opposite sexes. In sum, domestic partner benefits
are granted based on the sex of an employee's domestic partner.
The notion that discrimination based on the sex composition of
a couple amounts to sex discrimination against the individuals
comprising the couple has found recognition in cases that chal-
lenged the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples as sex
discrimination.' Those cases, however, were based on state
constitutions rather than Title VII.27 Yet, as shall be discussed,
Title VII law supports a similar rule in employment context. It
protects an individual from discrimination based on the individual's
association with another person of a particular sex. Thus, for
instance, an employee denied domestic partner benefits because she
is a female and her domestic partner is a male-but who otherwise
would be granted domestic partner benefits if her domestic partner
were female-could assert a cognizable claim under Title VII that
she suffered sex discrimination because of the sex of the domestic
partner with whom she maintains an association.
To date, two federal district courts have considered, and
rejected, claims of sex discrimination under Title VII with respect
to same-sex-only domestic partner benefits.'28 This part reviews
and analyzes those decisions. This part then reviews Title VII
authority which apparently was not considered by or presented to
the courts in those two cases, that recognizes claims of discrimina-
126. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (I]f twins, one male and one female, both wished to marry
a woman and otherwise met all of the Code's requirements, only gender prevents the twin
sister from marrying under the present law. Sex-based classification can hardly be more
obvious."); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993) ("It is the state's regulation of access
to the status of married persons, on the basis of the applicants' sex that gives rise to the
question whether the applicant couples have been denied the equal protection of the laws.
.. '); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 464, 880-86 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Vermont law classified
couples based on their sex composition and unconstitutionally excluded same-sex couples
from benefits and protections incident to marriage).
127. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60 (relying on the Equal Protection Clause of Hawaii
Constitution); Baker, 744 A.2d at 867 (relying on the Common Benefits Clause of the
Vermont Constitution); see also Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (discussing, in dicta, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution).
128. See Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 68 F. Supp. 2d 963, 966-67 (N.D. InI. 1999); Foray v.
Bell Atl., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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tion based on the protected characteristics of a person with whom
an individual associates. Next, it demonstrates how such a claim
is cognizable under Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination.
Finally, applying Title VII authority concerning sex discrimination,
this part concludes that domestic partner benefits policies limited
to employees in same-sex couples constitute illegal sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII.
A. Cleaves v. City of Chicago
In Cleaves v. City of Chicago,'" the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that a domestic partner benefits
policy limited to same-sex couples did not involve sex discrimination
at all. Instead, in a short but puzzling discussion, the court
ultimately determined that the policy discriminated on the basis of
marital status-without ever explaining how the policy treated any
employee or couple disparately on that basis.1 30 The court in
Cleaves reached its conclusion despite the express language of the
city ordinance, which based eligibility on the respective sexes of the
members of a domestic partnership.13'
The City of Chicago enacted a domestic partner ordinance that
provided "the same benefits, including but not limited to health
coverage, as are available to the spouse of an individual employed
by the city of Chicago" to qualifying employees in domestic partner-
ships who meet certain criteria, including that "the partners are the
same sex."132 This policy allowed an employee to take leave when
a member of a domestic partner's family died."3 Cleaves, who had
a female domestic partner, took leave to attend the funeral of his
domestic partner's stepfather.' 3' Cleaves represented the decedent
to be his "father-in-law." After the City discovered the actual
relationship, it terminated Cleaves's employment for absence
without leave and for a false statement. 135 Due to the fact that
Cleaves would have been eligible for leave to attend the funeral if
his sex had been female (because he and his domestic partner then
129. 21 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Ill. 1998), amended on reconsideration, 68 F. Supp. 2d 963
(N.D. IMI. 1999).
130. See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 967.
131. See CHICAGO, ILL CODE § 2-152-072 (effective May 16, 1997).
132. Id. The eligibility criteria in the ordinance make no mention of sexual orientation.
See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 966 n.2.
133. See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 966; Cleaves, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 861.
134. See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 965-66; Cleaves, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
135. See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
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would have been "the same sex" as required by the ordinance),
Cleaves sued the City for sex discrimination under Title VII. 36
The district court produced two opinions in Cleaves' case. In
Cleaves I, instead of addressing the factual basis of the claim as
involving sex discrimination, the court discussed it as alleging
marital status or sexual orientation discrimination.13 The court
explained that
Mr. Cleaves argues... that, since non-married homosexual
partners receive City benefits, non-married heterosexual
partners should receive City benefits. Drawing all inferences in
favor of Mr. Cleaves, it appears he is claiming that unmarried
homosexual couples are permitted sick days or leave when an
"in-law" dies but that unmarried heterosexual partners are not.
Marital status is not a protected classification under Title VII.
... While sex discrimination is cognizable, the facts in Mr.
Cleaves' claim... do not indicate any discrimination occurred
due to his gender. Mr. Cleaves' claim could be read to state a
claim for discrimination based on his heterosexual orientation;
that is, as a heterosexual in a relationship he does not have the
same rights as a homosexual in a relationship. Sexual orienta-
tion, however, also is not protected under Title VII. 1
Finding no aspect of the claim to allege discrimination based on sex,
the court dismissed the sex discrimination claim.
139
The opinion in Cleaves I was based on a pro se complaint. 40
After that decision, the court granted a motion for reconsideration,
received an amended complaint from the plaintiff along with
supplemental filings, and issued a new opinion.14 1 In Cleaves II, the
court acknowledged that the case did not involve sexual orientation
discrimination as an issue. 42 It confronted the issue of sex
discrimination:
136. See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 965; Cleaves, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
137. See Cleaves, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 861.
138. 1& (emphasis added).
139. See id.
140. See id. at 860.
141. See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 966 n.1.
142. See id. at 966 n.2.
The Ordinance was passed to give quasi-marital benefits to gay and lesbian
couples, although it does not mention sexual orientation. The City argues that
sexual orientation is not a protected category under Title VII, but this is
irrelevant, since Mr. Cleaves does not argue that he was discriminated against
because he was heterosexual.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Mr. Cleaves claims that, in view of [the] Ordinance, if he had
been a woman and everything else in his situation had been the
same, he would not have been terminated for taking bereave-
ment leave when his partner's father died. This, he avers, shows
he was fired because of sex, that is, merely because he was a
man and not a woman.1 3
Yet, even though Cleaves adduced the City's ordinance that
specifically required that domestic partners be of the same sex,'"
the court was not persuaded. It rejected Cleaves's sex discrimina-
tion argument as "creative and clever but incorrect."145
The court reasoned that Chicago's policy amounted to marital
status, and not sex, discrimination. First, the court correctly
summarized that "Mr. Cleaves' contention, in effect, is that if the
City extends bereavement benefits to unmarried same-sex couples
who cohabit, then Title VII requires those same benefits to be
extended to unmarried opposite-sex couples who cohabit."' At a
glance that statement-which was the court's own encapsulation of
the claim presented-should make clear that marital status
discrimination was not involved. After all, both same-sex couples
and opposite-sex couples who cohabit are unmarried and therefore
similarly situated in terms of marital status. The only difference
between the two types of couples is their sex composition. The
court's analysis, however, took an abrupt turn into a discussion of
marital status and "sex plus" discrimination. The court stated,
"Title VII, like most federal civil rights laws, is 'silent on the issue
of marital-status discrimination."" 7 But it noted that "discrimina-
tion on the basis of marriage plus sex violates Title VII.""4 ' It
concluded:
However, the Ordinance does not involve treating men less
favorably than women on the basis of marital status, but only
treating unmarried same-sex couples differently from unmar-
ried opposite-sex couples. It treats men and women exactly the
same: if Mr. Cleaves' nonmarital partner were male and they
otherwise met the criteria for domestic partnership, he would
have been eligible for any benefits available to same-sex female
couples, including bereavement benefits if these were included.
143. Ld. at 966.
144. See id.
146. Id. at 967.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 716 (9th Cir.
1999)).
148. Id. (citing Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971)).
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The Ordinance is therefore legal discrimination on the basis of
marital status, not sex discrimination involving discrimination
against men (or women) because of marital status.4 9
Accordingly, once again, the court dismissed Cleaves's claim for
failure to state a cause of action for sex discrimination under Title
VII.150
The court in Cleaves II had two bases for dismissing the sex
discrimination claim. First, it determined that the same-sex-only
domestic benefit policy amounted to marital status, but not sex,
discrimination. Second, it concluded that there was no sex
discrimination because the policy treated men and women the
same. The court's analysis and conclusion with respect to marital
status discrimination is puzzling. The court never expounded upon
how treating two types of couples, both of which it recognized as
"unmarried," differently constituted discrimination because of
marital status.15'
The basis for the court's unexplained conclusion that the policy
amounted to marital status discrimination most likely is the City's
motion to dismiss Cleaves' complaint." 2 The City defended its
ordinance against the sex discrimination claim by arguing that the
distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples "are based
upon marital status, and the capacity to be married, and not upon
gender.""a But if this argument was the basis for the court's
determination that the same-sex-only policy amounted to marital
status discrimination, the court offered no such indication. Cleaves
/H, therefore, may have held that same-sex-only domestic partner
policies constitute marital status discrimination, but the opinion
left that holding completely unreasoned and unsupported. With
respect to sex discrimination, the court in Cleaves II concluded that
there was no sex discrimination because the policy treated men and
women the same. The court noted that Mr. Cleaves, if he had a
male domestic partner, would have had the same eligibility for
domestic partner benefits as a female employee with a female
domestic partner.1" The policy thus "treats men and women
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See iU
152. See Defendant's Revised Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Partial Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 2-3, Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 68 F. Supp.
2d 963 (N.D. IMI. 1999) (No. 98-C-1219).
153. Id. at 3.
154. See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. at 967.
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exactly the same."'55 Both male and female employees alike were
eligible to receive benefits with respect to same-sex domestic
partners, and both male and female employees were equally
ineligible to receive benefits for opposite-sex domestic partners.
Therefore, male and female employees were treated equally as
individuals, and, accordingly, there was not sex discrimination."'
B. Foray v. Bell Atlantic5
In Foray, the employer instituted an employee benefits plan
that included an employee's "same-sex domestic partner" in the
definition of "eligible dependent." 5 ' Paul Foray, an employee of
Bell Atlantic's NYNEX subsidiary, submitted a request to add his
female domestic partner, Jeanine Muntzner, to the benefits plan. 59
NYNEX denied the request on the ground that Foray's "opposite-sex
domestic partner did not meet the eligibility criteria to qualify as a
Domestic Partner." s° The denial letter sent by NYNEX added that
it offers domestic partner benefits only to employees in same-sex
relationships because those employees cannot legally marry their
partners, whereas opposite-sex couples can do so.' s' In Foray's
complaint, he contended that "all things being equal, if Foray's
gender were female, he would be entitled to claim his domestic
partner as an eligible dependent under the benefits plan." 162
155. Id. The Cleaves court was able to distinguish the situation in Sprogis v. United
Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. at 967. In Sprogis, the
employer applied different marital status standards to male and female flight attendants.
See Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1197-98. In Cleaves, however, the court found that the Chicago
policy applied equally to male and female employees. See Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. at 967.
156. Cf DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1979). In that
case, plaintiffs alleged that the employer applied different employment criteria for men and
women in violation of Title VI. See id. The plaintiffs claimed that "if a male employee
prefers males as sexual partners, he will be treated differently from a female who prefers
male partners." Id. The court rejected the argument as an effort to extend Title VIrs
prohibition on sex discrimination to include sexual orientation. See id. In any event, it noted
that there was no sex discrimination: [Wlhether dealing with men or women the employer
is using the same criterion: it will not hire or promote a person who prefers sexual partners
of the same sex. Thus this policy does not involve different decisional criteria for the sexes."
Id.
157. 56 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
168. Id. at 328.
159. See id. The NYNEX domestic partner benefits plan provided employees' domestic
partners with medical, dental, and vision care coverage. The policy also included beneficiary
designations, leaves, relocation, life insurance, and adoption reimbursement. See i&
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 329.
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The court in Foray, however, did not recognize Foray's claim of
sex discrimination as cognizable under Title VII. 1' 3 The court noted
that Foray's claim-that "but for" his sex he would have been
treated differently---"is supported by legal theorists and a decision
in a different context by the Hawaii Supreme Court."1"'
It read Title VII, however, as imposing a different standard.
The Foray court conducted a sex discrimination analysis based on
the treatment accorded to individual male and female employees as
they are compared to each other.16 5 The court articulated the
applicable standard under Title VII as whether an individual "was
treated differently from 'similarly situated' persons of the opposite
sex."166 It qualified "similarly situated" as "similarly situated in all
material respects.' 6 7
As a result of Foray's claim that "he was treated differently
from similarly situated persons of the opposite sex," the court held
that his claim depended "on the assumption that a similarly
situated woman is one who has a female domestic partner."16 At
that point, the sex-based discrimination inherent in current
marriage laws destroyed Foray's sex discrimination claim under the
"similarly situated in all material respects" standard. The court
held that "a woman with a female domestic partner is differently
situated from plaintiff in material respects because under current
law, she, unlike plaintiff, is unable to marry her partner."6 9
Accordingly, "[a] woman and her same-sex domestic partner, unlike
plaintiff and [his female domestic partner] Ms. Muntzner, will
never be eligible for a host of benefits available to opposite-sex
couples who are able to marry,"170 with such benefits including
"those extended to married couples under defendant's employee
benefits plan.""' The court determined that the "difference in the
ability to marry"' 72 between men and women involved in relation-
ships with a female domestic partner "is material in the context of
a compensation plan which grants benefits to employees' chosen
163. See id. at 330.
164. Id. at 329 (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993), Andrew Koppelman,
Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
197, 208 (1994), and Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation:
A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VI, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1992)).
165. See id.
166. Id. at 329-30.
167. Id. (citing Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997)).
168. Id. at 330.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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partners."173 It continued: "NYNEX's policy of distinguishing
between unmarried opposite-sex couples and unmarried same-sex
couples reflects and remedies differences between these persons
which are material in this particular context, and does not discrimi-
nate between similarly situated men and women." 74 Therefore, the
Foray court concluded that the plan discriminated on the basis of
the 'ability to marry, and not on the basis of sex.'75 The court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim of sex discrimi-
nation. 176
C. Same-Sex-Only Domestic Partner Benefits as Sex Discrimina-
tion Based on the Sex of an Employee's Domestic Partner
Cleaves II and Foray remain the only court decisions to
consider whether same-sex only domestic partner benefit policies
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. Those cases both
involved policies that expressly limited eligibility to employees in
same-sex relationships, and they presented identical sex discrimi-
nation claims. Whereas both courts concluded that the policies did
not amount to sex discrimination, they analyzed the same claim
differently. The court in Cleaves H concluded that the policy
amounted to marital status discrimination and treated all men and
all women equally. Foray held that the same-sex-only policy did not
constitute sex discrimination because a male is not similarly
situated to a female in terms of the legal ability to marry a female
domestic partner. Given that only two district courts have consid-
ered the issue and applied different analyses, the law cannot be
considered settled on the question of whether domestic partner
benefits that are available only to employees in same-sex couples
173. Id.
174. Id. The holding that domestic partner benefits limited to same-sex couples
"remedies* their inability to marry and obtain spousal benefits accepts an argument rejected
by the California State Labor Commissioner in a case of sexual orientation discrimination.
See Ayyoub v. City of Oakland, No. 99-02937 (Cal. State Labor Comm'r Oct. 27, 1997). In
that case, the Labor Commissioner held that a purported remedy for discrimination in
marriage laws may itself be discriminatory and illegal. See supra Part III.C.
175. See Foray, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
As with plaintiffs Title VII claim, plaintiff has not been treated differently from
a woman with an opposite-sex partner, and there is no reason to conclude that
plaintiff has been treated differently from an unmarried woman with a female
domestic partner "on the basis of sex," instead of on the basis of his ability to
marry.
Id.
176. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Foray did not appeal the dismissal of his
complaint.
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amount to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. As shall be
discussed, Title VIi-in case law apparently not considered by the
courts in Cleaves II and Foray-protects an individual from
discrimination based on the protected characteristic of a person
with whom that individual associates.1 77  Title VII's authority
supports recognition of this rule under Title VII's prohibition on sex
discrimination, so that the statute prohibits discrimination based
on the sex of an employee's domestic partner. Under that rule and
because Title VII's statutory defenses to sex discrimination are not
applicable with respect to same-sex-only domestic partner benefits,
policies that limit domestic partner benefits to employees in same-
sex couples constitute illegal sex discrimination under Title VI.
Title VII's protection from discrimination extends beyond an
individual's own protected characteristics of race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin. Federal courts "have broadly construed
Title VII to protect individuals who are the victims of discrimina-
tory animus towards third persons with whom the individuals
associate."178 Under Title VII's prohibition on race discrimination,
a number of courts have held that the statute protects an individual
from discrimination by an employer because of that individual's
association with another person of a particular race. The seminal
case in this line of cases was Whitney v. Greater New York Corpora-
tion of Seventh Day Adventists.'79 In Whitney, a white woman
claimed that she suffered racial discrimination in violation of Title
VII when her employer discharged her because of her social
relationship with a black man."so The employer sought to dismiss
the claim on the ground that the employee had no standing to bring
a race discrimination claim, as the complaint alleged the employer
had discriminated on the basis of the race of the employee's friend
177. The papers filed on behalf of Foray did not cite any cases holding that Title VII
protects an individual from discrimination based on any protected characteristic of another
person with whom she associates. See generally Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Foray v. Bell Ati., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (No.
98-CV-3535 (Rpp)). The same authority also was not presented to the district court in
Cleaves Ior Cleaves Il. See generally BriefofPlaintiffin Support of Motion to Reconsider the
Ruling Denying the Claim of Sex Discrimination, and to Allow Plaintiffto File and Amended
Complaint as Specified in Plaintiffs Motion., Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 68 F. Supp. 2d 963
(N.D. IM. 1999) (No. 98-C-1219). The opinions in the cases do not cite or reference any such
authority.
178. Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, and GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d
988, 994 (6th Cir. 1999).
179. 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. See id. at 1365.
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and not on the basis of the employee's race."' The court disagreed,
holding,
Manifestly, if Whitney was discharged because, as alleged, the
defendant disapproved of a social relationship between a white
woman and a black man, the plaintiffs race was as much a
factor in the decision to fire her as that of her friend. Specifying
as she does that she was discharged because she, a white
woman, associated with a black, her complaint falls within the
statutory language that she was "discharge[d] ... because of
[her] race."1 82
The Southern District of New York thus recognized as cognizable
under Title VII the claim that an individual suffers racial discrimi-
nation when an employer treats her adversely because of her
relationship or association with an individual of a particular race.
Subsequent published cases that presented claims of racial
discrimination based on association have unanimously endorsed
Whitney's holding. 3
Title VI's text prohibits an employer from discriminating
"against any individual.., because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.""' A claim of discrimination based
on the protected characteristics of a person with whom an individ-
ual associates is not directed entirely, or even at all, at the individ-
ual's own protected characteristics Nonetheless, Title VII's
language has not been read literally as applying only to an individ-
181. See id. at 1366.
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 993-95; Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 156
F.3d 581, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1998), petition for reh'g en bane granted, 169 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), reinstated and vacated in part on other grounds, 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (en
banc); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 891-92 (11th Cir. 1986);
LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762, 772-73 (D. Neb. 1999); Rosenblatt
v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 946 F. Supp. 298,299-300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Woods v. Bentsen, 889
F. Supp. 179, 187 n.13 (E.D. Penn. 1995); Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 682 (C.D. Cal.
1991); Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442, 1444-45 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Holiday
v. Belle's Restaurant, 409 F. Supp. 904, 908-09 (W.D. Penn. 1976); see also Stacks v.
Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1327 n.6 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that it
could not find that the prior cases (i.e., Whitney) were incorrect). The only contrary authority
is found in Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973), a decision prior to
Whitney, and Adams v. Governor's Comm. on Postsecondary Educ., No. C80-624A, 1981 WL
27101 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981), a reported but unpublished decision subsequent to Whitney.
Both of these decisions, contrary to Whitney, were issued from district courts within the
Eleventh Circuit. Given the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Parr that followed the holding in
Whitney and discussed but declined to follow Ripp and Adams, those two contrary decisions
can no longer be considered valid authority. See Parr, 791 F.2d at 891-92.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aXl) (1994) (emphasis added).
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ual herself, so that it would preclude a discrimination claim based
on association with another individual." 5 As the statutory lan-
guage is not qualified by a requirement that discrimination against
an individual be based "directly" on one of that individual's
protected characteristics, Title VII's protection extends beyond the
individual to include protecting her from discrimination against
herself because of the protected characteristics of a third party with
whom she has a relationship or association.'" An employer who
discriminates against an employee on the basis of a protected
characteristic of another person with whom the employee associates
"reacts adversely" to the employee's own protected characteristic as
it relates to the third party's protected characteristic. 8 7 The "net
effect" is that the employer has discriminated against the employee
on the basis of her own protected characteristic. 88
The rule that Title VII prohibits discrimination against an
individual because of the protected characteristic of individual with
whom she associates has been applied mostly with respect to claims
185. See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994-95; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892 (*It makes no difference whether
the plaintiff specifically alleges in his complaint that he has been discriminated against
because of his race.").
186. See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994-95. Title VII is a broad, remedial statute enacted by
Congress to eradicate prohibited bases of discrimination in employment, and "the duty of the
courts [is] to make sure [that] the Act works, and that the intent of Congress is not hampered
by a combination of a strict construction of the statute in a battle with semantics." Parr, 791
F.2d at 892 (quoting Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970)).
"Title VII's plain language does not address this precise point; but, read as a whole, it does."
Deffenbaugh.Williams, 156 F.3d at 588. A prohibition on discrimination based on an
individual's associations is not contained in the express language of Title VII, but 'statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils." Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998) (holding that Title VIrs
prohibition on discrimination because of sex extends to prohibit same-sex sexual
harassment).
187. See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995.
188. See id. "Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage
or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of
his race." Parr, 791 F.2d at 892. In Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D.
Ga. 1984), involving a discrimination claim that included an interracial marriage, the court
held,
(Ihf... the plaintiff].., had been black, the alleged discrimination would not
have occurred. In other words ... but for [her] being white, the plaintiff] ...
would not have been discriminated against. This court cannot imagine what
more need be alleged to bring [the plaintiff] within the plain meaning of Title
vIrs prescription of discrimination against an individual "because of such
individual's race".
Id. at 1445; see also Rosenblatt, 946 F. Supp. at 300. InRosenblatt, the court held, in a case
involving an interracial marriage, that plaintiff stated a cognizable discrimination claim
because "(hiad he been black, his marriage would not have been interracial.... [DInherent
in his complaint is the assertion that he has suffered racial discrimination based on his own
race."
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of racial discrimination. 9 The question remains whether it
extends to all types of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
The Southern District of New York decided Whitney in 1975.
The holding in Whitney, however, has taken root on a broader scale
only more recently, as it has been recognized and adopted by
multiple federal circuit courts.' The Whitney line of cases remains
surprisingly little known in employment discrimination law. Thus,
few cases have sought to extend the rule to the other types of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. One federal district court,
however, has held that the same rule applies to Title VII's prohibi-
tion on national origin discrimination. 9'
By simple analogy, a plausible argument can be made that the
associational discrimination rule emanating from race discrimina-
tion cases applies to sex and the other types of discrimination
prohibited by Title VII. The extension of the holding to Title VII's
national origin provision provides persuasive support for that
argument.'92 Still, analogizing is not necessary to conclude that the
same rule prohibiting associational discrimination based on race
under Title VII also applies to cases of associational discrimination
based on sex. Under Title VII, the Supreme Court has held that "a
distinction based on sex stands on the same footing as a distinction
based on race.' 93
In a case alleging pregnancy discrimination, one federal district
court has held that Title VII prohibits sex-based associational
discrimination the same as it prohibits race-based associational
189. Most of the cases recognizing and applying the rule have involved interracial
marriages. See, e.g., Parr, 791 F. Supp. at 888; Rosenblatt, 946 F. Supp. at 298; Gresham,
586 F. Supp. at 1442. One case involved an employee's claim of discrimination because he
had a biracial child. See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 988. Marriage and family relationships generally
receive greater deference and protection in the law than other types of relationships, but the
rule in the Whitney line of cases has not been limited to marital and family relationships.
For instance, Whitney involved a'casual social relationship." Whitney v. Greater New York
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The rule applies
to any "relationship." See Deffenbaugh-Williams, 156 F.3d at 589 (holding that the rule
applies to a "relationship" alone as well as married relationships and upholding recovery in
case in which plaintiff married her fiancd shortly before her discharge from her employment
and could have alleged discrimination based on an interracial marriage but did not do so).
190. See supra note 183.
191. See Reiter v. Center Consolidated Sch. Dist., 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1460 (D. Colo. 1985)
('Discriminatory employment practices based on an individual's association with people of
a particular race or national origin are prohibited under Title VII." (emphasis added)).
192. See Reiter, 618 F. Supp. at 1460.
193. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083-84 (1983). The only
exception to this holding is when a distinction based on sex falls within one of the few
defenses that Title VII provides to its prohibition on sex discrimination . Title VII does not
provide these defenses with respect to racial discrimination. See id. at 1084.
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discrimination. In Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., the court concluded
that a male plaintiff stated a cognizable claim when he alleged that
his employer discriminated against him when it discharged him
because of his wife's pregnancy. 195 The court found the Title VII sex
discrimination claim inNicol "analogous to claims of discrimination
based on interracial relationships."';9 The Nicol court compared the
plaintiffs claim to the case of"a white man who had been discrimi-
nated against because of his own race and the racial prejudices
against white men who are married to a black woman."' 7 Corre-
spondingly, the court concluded,
Mr. Nicol has stated a claim as a married man who has alleg-
edly been discriminated against because of his own sex and the
prejudices of the defendant against men who are married to
pregnant women. Thus, just as the plaintiff in Parr was
discriminated against because of his race, Mr. Nicol has been
discriminated against because of his sex.'"
In challenging domestic partner benefits limited to employees
in same-sex relationships as sex discrimination, an employee claims
discrimination based on the sex of the domestic partner with whom
she has a relationship, as well as based on her own sex. The above
discussion demonstrates that such a claim of sex discrimination
based on an employee's association with a person of a particular sex
is cognizable under Title VII. This part now considers same-sex-
only domestic benefits policies under Title VII authority specific to
sex discrimination.
In most cases, a plaintiff challenging a same-sex-only policy as
sex discrimination will not face a difficult task in establishing that
an employer's policy discriminates on the basis of sex. Most
policies, if they limit benefits to employees in same-sex couples, do
so on their face by requiring that an employer and her domestic
partner be of the "same sex" or the "same gender."1 " These policies
expressly base eligibility for domestic partner benefits on an
194. 773 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Va. 1991).
195. See id. at 806. Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
provides that discrimination because ofpregnancy is discrimination "because of sex." See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
196. Id. at S05 (citing Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th
Cir. 1999), Reiter, 618 F. Supp. at 1460, Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442,
1445 (N.D. Ga. 1984), and Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists,
401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
197. Id. at 806.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 125, 132, 158.
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employee's sex and the sex of her domestic partner, as they compare
to each other. On their face, such policies discriminate on the basis
of sex. They are thus direct evidence of sex discrimination."' To
maintain a claim of sex discrimination, an employee also must
establish that she and her domestic partner otherwise satisfy an
employer's other criteria for qualifying for domestic partnership
benefits (e.g., duration of relationship, exclusive commitment,
residing together). By presenting a facially discriminatory policy
and otherwise meeting the eligibility requirements for domestic
partner benefits, an employee has established that "but for" her sex
or the sex of her domestic partner-as they compare-her employer
would compensate her with domestic partner benefits.0 1
Once sex discrimination has been established, the inquiry
shifts to the employer to demonstrate that a policy fits within any
of the statutory defenses to sex discrimination provided by Title
VII. The first statutory defense is the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) defense. 22 The BFOQ defense is inapplicable
200. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); see also UAW
v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991) ("Respondents fetal-protection policy
explicitly discriminates against women on the basis of their sex. The policy excludes women
with childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs and so creates a facial classification based
on gender."); Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)
(concluding that employer's policy requiring female employers to pay greater pension fund
contributions than male employees was discriminatory on its face).
201. Cf Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711 (explaining that "but for" plaintiffs sex, she would not
be required to contribute as much to her employer's pension fund). Some policies that provide
domestic partner benefits only to employees in same-sex couples may not explicitly mention
"sex" or'gender." Instead, they may base eligibility on an employee's legal ability or inability
to marry her domestic partner. See, e.g., Oracle Statement ofDomestic Partnership, in KOHN,
supra note 1, app. at 57 (requiring an employee and her domestic partner to acknowledge
that "[w]e understand that Oracle domestic partner benefits are available to us only when
legal marriage is not available to us in our state of residence," and making no reference to
sex). By defaulting to state marriage laws and a couple's ability or inability to marry under
those laws, such domestic partner benefit policies base eligibility on sex without stating so
directly. Marriage laws, as multiple courts have recognized, discriminate on the basis of sex
in restricting which couple can marry. See supra note 126. Thus, if policies that extend
eligibility based on a couple's inability to marry under state law are not direct evidence of sex
discrimination, they most likely establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
202. Title VII provides that an employer may discriminate on the basis of "religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(eX1) (1994). The bona fide
occupational qualification exception is written narrowly, and the Supreme Court has read
it narrowly. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201. It involves "objective, verifiable
requirements [that) must concern job-related skills and aptitudes." Id.
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to the sex discrimination question presented here, as the terms of
a benefits plan have no connection to occupational qualifications." 3
The other statutory defense incorporates within Title VII the
defenses provided in the Equal Pay Act.2 The Equal Pay Act
prohibits wage differentials for equivalent work performed by men
and women, unless the disparity in pay is based on (1) a seniority
system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production, or (4) "any other factor other
than sex."2"5 The first three defenses are generally inapplicable to
domestic partner benefits. Such benefits typically do not involve a
seniority system or a merit system in any way. They also do not
depend upon or vary according to an employee's quantity or quality
of production. Domestic partner benefits typically are provided
based on the fact of employment and without regard to quantity or
quality of work,2 "' as long as an employee's relationship satisfies an
employer's domestic partner benefits criteria.
The fourth defense--"any factor other than sex"-almost
certainly would be raised by an employer. An employer can be
expected to argue that a domestic partner benefits policy that limits
benefits to employees in same-sex couples is not based on sex but
rather on sexual orientation, marital status,20 7 or the ability of
opposite-sex couples to marry legally and obtain spousal benefits.
Such arguments would not withstand scrutiny in most cases,
particularly because most policies that limit eligibility to same-sex
couples expressly state that the domestic partners must be of the
same sex.208 A court should be skeptical when an employer, on the
one hand, explicitly bases eligibility for benefits on sex in the terms
of its policy but then, on the other hand, argues that the policy is
based on a factor other than sex.
203. Cf Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1085 n.13 (1983) ("The
exception for bona fide occupational qualifications... is inapplicable since the terms of a
retirement plan have nothing to do with occupational qualifications.).
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h); County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168
(1981).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
206. As with other types of benefits, an employer might require that an employee work
a minimum number of hours in a period or be employed for a minimum period of time before
becoming eligible for domestic partner benefits.
207. Despite the fact that their policies expressly required that couples be of the same sex
in order to be eligible for domestic partner benefits, the employers in Cleaves and Foray
defended their policies as legal discrimination based on marital status or sexual orientation.
See Revised Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs
First Amended Complaint at 2-3, Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 68 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (No. 98-C-1219). See generally Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, Foray v. Bell Atl., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 98-CV-3525).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 125, 132, 158.
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With respect to sexual orientation, nearly all domestic partner
benefits policies make no reference to sexual orientation.0 9 It also
is extremely unlikely that employers make any inquiry into the
sexual orientation of an employee or the employee's domestic
partner.210 Accordingly, an employer most likely cannot credibly
assert that its policy is based on sexual orientation. Despite the
lack of inquiry, an employer still could be expected to argue that the
fact that a couple is of the same sex means that its members are
gay or lesbian (and that an opposite-sex couple necessarily means
that its members are heterosexual), so that the sex-based classifica-
tion of couples really amounts to a classification on the basis of
sexual orientation. The mere fact that a couple has a particular
gender composition is not ipso facto proof of the sexual orientations
of its members.211 Individuals in same-sex relationships likely are
gay or lesbian, but individuals and relationships differ. Many
possibilities exist: a member of a same-sex couple may be gay or
lesbian, bisexual, heterosexual, asexual, or simply unsure or
questioning, or the relationship may be non-sexual.212 Not only is
a sweeping generalization concerning sexual orientation that is
based on a couple's gender composition possibly inaccurate, Title
VII condemns such generalization based on sex. It prohibits the use
of sex as a general predictor for the existence of an otherwise legal
factor on which to base an employment action.213 When an em-
ployer considers sex in such a manner, its policy is not based on a
factor other than sex.2 14
Same-sex-only domestic partner policies also do not act based
on marital status in excluding opposite-sex couples. According to
the standard argument that such exclusion is based on marital
status, opposite-sex couples are denied couples' benefits simply
209. But see supra Part III.C (discussing Ayyoub v. City of Oakland).
210. Such inquiry may be illegal in some states. See supra text accompanying note 99.
211. The Hawaii marriage case involved a statute that facially discriminated based on a
couple's gender composition. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,60 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii
Supreme Court rejected an effort by the state to characterize all same-sex couples as
homosexual and, conversely, to cast all opposite-sex couples as heterosexual. See id. at 51-52
& n.11, 61 & n.22. The court held that the classification would be analyzed as sex
discrimination because the statute facially discriminated on the basis of sex. See ik at 60-61,
64-67.
212. Cf id. at 51 n.11 (discussing how "homosexual" and "same-sex" marriages are not
synonymous).
213. Title vIrs "focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class." Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
214. Cf id at 712 (holding that a scheme using sex to predict longevity was based on no
other factor but sex).
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215because they have not exercised their legal option to marry.
Hence, because of their unmarried marital status, they are denied
benefits. With respect to spousal benefits, this argument is true.
Spousal benefits flow to an employee and her opposite-sex spouse
when there is a lawful marriage; the lack of a marriage results in
the denial of benefits to that couple. Thus, the denial of spousal
benefits to an unmarried opposite-sex couple is based on the
couple's unmarried marital status. However, the denial of domestic
partner benefits to opposite-sex couples is not based on marital
status because domestic partner benefits policies remove marriage
as the prerequisite for obtaining couples' benefits. Domestic
partnership, by definition, is a committed relationship that is an
alternative to or substitute for marriage. Irrespective of whether
a couple has formed a domestic partnership because of a legal
inability to marry or a choice not to do so, all couples in domestic
partnerships have the same unmarried marital status simply
because they have not entered into a lawful marriage. Thus, all
employees in domestic partnerships are similarly situated with
respect to marital status.16 Therefore, because all employees in
domestic partnerships are unmarried, policies that limit benefits to
same-sex domestic partnerships are not based on marital status.
The chief "factor other than sex" that an employer could be
expected to assert is that a same-sex-only benefits policy is based
on opposite-sex couples' legal ability to marry and thereby obtain
spousal benefits.217 This argument reflects the "level the playing
field" line of reasoning. However, an examination just below the
surface reveals that this asserted neutral factor of the ability to
marry is, in fact, a factor based on sex. One need only ask why,
under current marriage laws, opposite-sex couples have the ability
215. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4, Foray v. Bell
Ati., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 98-CV-3525) ("Had [Foray] and Ms. Muntzner
chosen to marry, spousal coverage for Ms. Muntzner, as [Foray's] wife, would be fully
available; because they have chosen not to, spousal coverage is unavailable.*).
216. See Ayyoub v. City of Oakland, No. 99-02937, slip op. at 2 (Cal. State Labor Comm'r
Oct. 27, 1997) (holding that unmarried opposite-sex and unmarried same-sex couples are
.simflarly-situated").
217. See, e.g., Foray, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 330 (stating that because same-sex couples are
unable to marry, the policy at issue "does not discriminate between similarly situated men
and women"); see also Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, Foray
v. Bell Atl., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 98-CV-3525) ("These criteria, of course,
are based on the sensible and self-evident proposition that heterosexual employees can
obtain coverage for their partners by getting married, an option not available to homosexual
employees."); cf Ayyoub, No. 99-0237, slip op. at 2. (quoting employer's response to
discrimination complaint, in which the employer argued that a domestic partner benefits
policy limited to gay and lesbian employees aimed to remedy their inability to marry their
partners and thereby obtain spousal benefits).
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to marry while same-sex couples cannot. The answer is clear:
because of sex. As multiple courts have recently recognized, state
marriage statutes facially discriminate on the basis of sex in
providing which couples can marry legally and which couples
cannot do so.21 Because marriage laws base a couple's ability or
inability to marry on sex, the ability to marry is a factor based
entirely on sex. Thus, the defense that same-sex-only policies
discriminate based on the ability of same-sex couples to marry only
proves what it seeks to disprove: that the factor on which policies
limited to same-sex couples base eligibility is sex. At bottom, the
argument that the ability or inability to marry is a factor other than
sex presents nothing more than a difference without a distinction.
As the ability to marry is not based on a "factor other than sex," it
accordingly cannot serve as a defense to policies that limit benefits
to same-sex couples. Because same-sex-only domestic partner
benefit policies discriminate on the basis of sex and no statutory
defense to sex discrimination can be established with respect to
them, such policies constitute illegal sex discrimination under Title
VII.
V. CONCLUSION
The number of employers offering domestic partner benefits to
employees seems almost certain to continue to grow, as employers
offer enhanced compensation packages to recruit and retain
employees and as committed relationships that fall outside of the
traditional male-female marriage model receive greater acknowl-
edgment. In providing domestic partner benefits, employers face
the question of whether those benefits should be extended to all
employees or only to employees in same-sex domestic partnerships.
In addition to concern about costs, the conception in some minds of
domestic partnership as a parallel institution available only to
same-sex couples as consolation for their inability to marry may
cause some employers to limit domestic partner benefits to
employees in same-sex relationships. However, such a limitation,
depending on the terms of the policy and the applicable laws, may
constitute illegal employment discrimination.
In most cases, ERISA most likely preempts the application of
state and local discrimination laws to employee benefits and leaves
218. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 (Vt. 1999).
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federal law to govern employee benefits. An employee may
challenge the limitation on domestic partner benefits to employees
in same-sex couples as sex discrimination under Title VII. Most
same-sex-only policies facially base eligibility on sex-that is, on the
employee's sex as it compares to the sex of her domestic partner.
Whereas two federal district courts have held that same-sex-only
domestic partner benefits policies do not violate Title VII, the courts
analyzed the claims differently and did not apply relevant Title VII
law concerning discrimination based on an employee's associations.
In a little-noticed line of precedent, courts have held Title VII to
prohibit discrimination not just against an individual employee
because of one of her protected characteristics, but also against an
employee based on the protected characteristic of a person with
whom the employee maintains an association. Title VII authority
also supports recognition of this rule under the statute's prohibition
on sex discrimination. Thus, an employee in an opposite-sex
domestic partnership who has been denied benefits for her domestic
partner can present a cognizable sex discrimination claim against
a same-sex-only policy under Title VII: that her employer, in
denying domestic partner benefits, discriminated against her based
on the sex of the domestic partner with whom she associates. If the
sex of the employee's domestic partner had been different so that it
was the same as the employee's sex, the employee would have been
granted benefits for her domestic partner. The described circum-
stance presents a patent case of discrimination based on sex.
Because domestic partner benefits policies that limit eligibility to
employees in same-sex couples discriminate on the basis of sex and
these policies fail to satisfy any of Title VII's statutory defenses to
sex discrimination, they constitute a violation of Title VII's
prohibition on discrimination because of sex.
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